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INTRODUCTION

T

he imposition and implementation of international sanctions has typically been viewed as a discretionary matter
dependent on states’ political judgments. For a realist, it is only
natural that sanctions, easily amongst the most dramatic and
consequential forms of international engagement short of military conflict, should be governed by fundamentally political concerns.
Scratch the surface, however, and the international sanctions
regime appears a little different. Since the end of the Cold War,
the use of sanctions by the United Nations, as well as other major global actors, has increased significantly.1 At the same time,
rights-based concerns have increasingly made themselves felt,
gradually reshaping every component of the manner in which
sanctions are designed and applied.
Sanction’ is an ambiguous and capacious term.2 In the context
of the law at large, a sanction’ is generally understood as “a penalty or punishment provided as a means of enforcing obedience
1. See Richard Haas, Sanctioning Madness, 7 FOREIGN AFF. 74 (Nov. Dec.
1997) (observing that following the end of the Cold War, economic coercion was
“fast becoming the United States’ policy tool of choice”); Larry Minear, David
Cortright, Julia Wagler, George Lopez & Thomas Weiss, Toward a More Humane and Effective Sanctions Management: Enhancing the Capacity of the
U.N. System, WATSON INST. INT’L STUD., 1998, at i, v (“The end of the Cold War
created a climate within the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Sanctions,
both comprehensive and partial, are a more viable policy option than earlier.
They are no longer the virtual dead letter of the Charter that they had been. .
. .”); MICHAEL MATHESON, COUNCIL UNBOUND: THE GROWTH OF UN DECISION
MAKING ON CONFLICT AND POSTCONFLICT ISSUES AFTER THE COLD WAR (2006)
(highlighting the Security Council’s increasing activity following the end of the
Cold War on all fronts, including through the imposition of sanctions); Thomas
Biersteker, Sue Eckert, Marcos Tourinho & Zuzana Hudáková, The Effectiveness of United Nations Targeted Sanctions: Findings from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC), WATSON INST. INT’L STUD., Nov. 2013, at 1, 7 (“Targeted sanctions are increasingly utilized by the United Nations to address a
wide range of threats to regional peace and security”).
2. As Farrall notes, there is no commonly agreed definition of sanctions in
international law. See JEREMY FARRALL, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND THE
RULE OF LAW (2007). For its part, the international law commission has observed that the term sanction’ is “imprecise”; see Int’l Law Comm’n [ILC],
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
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to a law.”3 In general international law, sanctions’ are often understood similarly as penalties or punishments of one sort or
another applied to states or other actors which have violated
their international obligations.4 In this article, however, the aim
is not to establish a more formalistic definition of sanctions,’ but
rather to track a particular manner in which the term has been
deployed in practice. Overwhelmingly, when discussed in the
context of international relations, sanctions’ refers to a set of
measures primarily, but not exclusively economic in nature
imposed against states, organizations or individuals.5 Amongst
the measures most frequently encountered in this context are
general embargoes and boycotts, embargoes and boycotts on specific goods, limitations on particular forms of aid and support,
bans on investment, travel bans, and asset freezes.6
Part I of this article begins by examining the manner in which
rights-based concerns have manifested themselves within the
realm of international sanctions in recent years. Two distinct
moments are observable here. First, extensive criticism of the
human suffering caused by the more comprehensive sanctions
imposed in the 1990s, specifically on Iraq, helped to encourage

Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No.
10, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts].
3. See Sanction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1995).
4. Much of the debate here has focused on whether only officially and multilaterally authorized sanctions should count as sanctions as such. Georges
Abi-Saab, for instance, has preferred such an understanding, defining sanctions as “coercive measures taken in execution of a decision of a competent
social organ, i.e., an organ legally empowered to act in the name of the society
or community that is governed by the legal system.” See Georges Abi-Saab, The
Concept of Sanction in International Law, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLOQUIUM ON UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1999 (Genève Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001).
5. The manner in which sanctions’ has come to be used has tracked the
Security Council’s use of its Chapter VII powers despite the fact, ironically,
that Chapter VII refers to measures’ and not to sanctions’. For recognition of
this point, see Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, supra note 2, art. 22(3).
6. In addition, sanctions in practice are broadly clustered around five thematic purposes: conflict resolution, democratization, the protection of civilians,
counter-terrorism, and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
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the replacement of more comprehensive sanctions by more targeted approaches.7 Second, the new, more targeted approach to
sanctions, and particularly the broad and undisciplined manner
in which it was put into effect following the attacks of September
11, 2001, invited a second rights-based critique, this time on the
basis of due process concerns.8 This led to a series of gradual reforms aimed at bringing international sanctions more fully into
compliance with a rule of law framework.
These two moments already make clear that rights-based concerns have had considerable impact on the shape of international sanctions. There is a third component to this story as well,
however one that is both more overarching and perhaps also,
for that reason, subtler and more contested. This third component pertains to when the imposition of sanctions may be
deemed required by law. There are doubtless some who would
contend that, while the scope of sanctions may have limits, and
individuals targeted by sanctions may be entitled to due process
guarantees, the decision to impose a sanction or not is a matter
of pure state discretion. Careful attention to international law
and practice, however, suggests that such discretion is bounded,
and that, in particular, the imposition of sanctions is required
relative to the worst instances of public international law violation.
The growing sense that sanctions may be required in such instances may be traced in two different manners. First, the various humanist threads of public international law have increasingly come to recognize an expanded regime of responsibility relative to instances of mass harm in particular.9 Part II, therefore,

7. See Minear et al., supra note 1 (observing the criticisms and making
recommendations for reform, under a mandate from the United Nations); see
infra Part I.A.
8. See, e.g., Peter Fitzgerald, If Property Rights Were Treated Like Human
Rights, They Could Never Get Away with This: Blacklisting and Due Process in
U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 73 (2000); Iain Cameron,
European Union Anti-Terrorist Blacklisting, 3 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 255 (2003);
Peter Gutherie, Security Council Sanctions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 491 (2005); see infra Part I.B.
9. This is testified to by increasing emphasis on extraterritorial responsibility in international human rights law, on positive obligations and obligations of due diligence in international humanitarian law, by the development
of international criminal law as such, as well as by the expansion of the jurisprudence on complicity in such a context, and by the historically developing
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considers the manner in which ideas of extraterritorial obligations, positive obligations, complicity and the obligation to respond to mass harm have evolved in international human rights
law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law
and general international law over the last several decades. On
the basis of this investigation, it becomes apparent that public
international law not only requires that sanctions be appropriately targeted and that sanctions measures comply with due process concerns, but also that sanctions10 be imposed where serious, ongoing harms are occurring.
Second, the manner in which sanctions are imposed in practice
has increasingly come to be defined with reference to rightsbased concerns. Part III demonstrates this by exploring the
manner in which the practice of the imposition of sanctions on
the part of the United States, the European Union and the
United Nations has evolved over the last several decades. This
investigation reveals that rights-based concerns have been increasingly referenced, and increasingly relied upon to shape, the
nature of sanctions in practice.
Thus, both law and practice suggest that, in addition to the
shifts in the nature of sanctions detailed in Part II, further
shifts, pertaining to a potential obligation to impose sanctions in
certain instances, are also underway. This is not meant to suggest that the element of discretion has been entirely removed,
nor that all sanctions imposed in practice comply with the relevant rights-based principles clearly, many do not. The point,
rather, is that legal obligations have gradually been thickening
and extending, and thereby coming to exert an enhanced pressure on states to comply with their dictates, as demonstrated
both by the development of public international law as such, as
well as by the growing incorporation of rights into the language
and structure of sanctions regimes in practice.
Finally, Part IV of this article takes a step back to contemplate
such a development from a bigger picture perspective, considering the manner in which a law and rights-bounded frame has
been gradually intruding on a more discretionary one in practice. The section argues that while from one perspective, states
and their organs, such as the Security Council, maintain a high
emphasis on jus cogens obligations within general international law, as discussed further in Part II below. See infra Part II.
10. While the label sanctions’ is rarely used in such a context, sanctions are,
in effect, the measures required by the relevant legal rules.
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degree of discretionary authority, from another perspective their
decisions both as a matter of law and practice have become
increasingly constrained.
I. FROM GROUP TO TARGETED SANCTIONS, AND THE RISE OF DUE
PROCESS CONCERNS
Developments in the 1990s and 2000s illustrate two distinct
ways in which rights-based concerns have influenced the manner in which sanctions are imposed and governed. First, the
1990s saw more comprehensive, nationally-targeted sanctions
criticized on the basis of the broad suffering they caused and
their negative effects on human rights, contributing to the development of the more targeted approach to sanctions that is the
norm today. This development led to a new critique, as targeted
sanctions in turn came to be criticized on the basis of the lack of
due process guarantees provided for in the context of their application and enforcement.
A. From General to Targeted Sanctions
The Security Council only imposed sanctions twice during the
Cold War, against Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977.11
After the end of the Cold War, the Security Council imposed
sanctions ten times between 1990 and 1998 alone. This rapid expansion in the use of sanctions led immediately to contestation,
as several of the assertive sanctions regimes imposed were criticized on the basis that they were leading to widespread suffering. More than any other regime, it was sanctions on Iraq, initially imposed in 1990, after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, that received the most extensive condemnation.12 Criticism came in the
form of journalistic pieces,13 scholarly commentary,14 and United
11. See S.C. Res. 232 (Dec. 16, 1966); S.C. Res. 418 (Nov. 4, 1977).
12. The sanctions were imposed by S.C. Res. 661 (Aug. 6, 1990). The regime
did allow for a humanitarian exception. That exception did little to diminish
the harm caused by the sanctions, however, demonstrating the limited ability
of exception-based carve-outs to cure fundamentally ill-designed legal regimes.
13. See, e.g., Michael Powell, The Deaths He Cannot Sanction: Ex-UN
Worker Details Harm to Iraqi Children, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1998; John Muller & Karl Muller, Sanctions of Mass Destruction, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 43 (1999).
14. See, e.g., Rene Provost, Starvation as a Weapon: Legal Implications of
the United Nations Food Blockade Against Iraq and Kuwait, 30 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 577, 616 (1992); Alberto Ascherio et al., Effect of the Gulf War
on Infant and Child Mortality in Iraq, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 931 (1992);
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Nations and NGO reports.15 Following the ouster of Aristide by
a coup in 1991, the OAS and the General Assembly called for
sanctions,16 a call given binding force by the Security Council in
1993.17 After a bloodless coup in Burundi on July 25, 1996, regional heads of state imposed a general embargo.18 Both sets of
sanctions received similar criticisms to those levied against the
Iraq sanctions.19 A series of General Assembly resolutions

David Cortright & George Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic Case of
Iraq, J. INT’L AFF. 735 (1999). For a more recent account, see JAY GORDON,
INVISIBLE WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND THE IRAQ SANCTIONS (2012).
15. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Letter Dated 20 March 1991 from the
Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2236 (Mar. 28, 1991); U.N. Secretary-General, WHO/UNICEF Special
Mission to Iraq, U.N. Doc. S/22328 (Mar. 4, 1991); U.N. Secretary General,
Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General
on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, ¶ 70 75,
U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 (Jan. 25, 1995); 26th International Conference of
the Red Cross & Red Crescent, Res. 4: Principles and Action in International
Humanitarian Assistance and Protection (Sept. 15, 1995); U.N., Food & Agric.
Org. [FAO], Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq (Dec. 10, 1995),
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/261.html; Ctr. Econ. Soc. Rts., Unsanctioned Suffering: A Human Rights Assessment of UN Sanctions on Iraq
(May 1996); U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/8
(Dec. 12, 1997); U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33
(June 21, 2000); U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, General Comment 14: The Right
to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug.
11, 2000); Anglican Observer Office at the U.N. et al., Iraq Sanctions: Humanitarian Implications and Options for the Future, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (2002),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/170-sanctions/41947.html.
16. See Org. of Am. States [OAS] Res. 1/91, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/V.1,
MRE/RES.1/91 (Oct. 2, 1991); OAS Res. 2/91, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/V.1,
MRE/RES.2/91 (Oct. 8, 1991); G.A. Res. 47/20 (Nov. 24, 1992).
17. See S.C. Res. 841 (June 16, 1993).
18. For more details on which, see Gregory Mthembu-Salter, An Assessment
of Sanctions Against Burundi, ACTION AID, May 1999; Julia Grauvogel, Regional Sanctions Against Burundi: The Regime’s Argumentative Self-Entrapment, 53 J. MODERN AFF. STUD. 169 (2015).
19. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, U.N. Doc. A/47/599 (Nov. 3, 1992); HARVARD CENTER FOR
POPULATION & DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, SANCTIONS IN HAITI: CRISIS IN
HUMANITARIAN ACTION (1993); Carole Cleaver, Notes from the Hell that is Haiti:
On the Verge of Collapse, NEW LEADER, Jan. 17, 1994, at 5; Cathy Booth, Still
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passed in the late 1990s similarly criticized United States sanctions on Cuba, amongst other reasons due to “their negative effects on the realization of all the human rights of vast sectors of
their populations, in particular children, women and the elderly.”20
At the same time, more targeted measures started to be deployed alongside more comprehensive measures from the early
1990s on. Sanctions imposed on the former Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia between 1991 1994, on Libya in 1992 and 1993 and
on Haiti in 1994 were overall more general in form, but also took
more targeted measures aimed at government finances.21 Substate actors were targeted for the first time in 1993, in the case
of the Bosnian Serbs.22 Sanctions imposed relative to Somalia,
Liberia, Angola, Rwanda and Sierra Leone also all included targeted measures a step prompted by the fact that there were
civil wars in all five countries, leading the international community to recognize the need to target particular actors within
those states, rather than simply the states as such.23 Successfully implementing targeted measures required a greater degree
of sophistication, however a challenge the Security Council
Punishing the Victims, TIME, Apr. 11, 1994, at 55; U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question Concerning Haiti, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/1012 (Aug. 26, 1994); Gregory Mthembu-Salter, An Assessment of Sanctions Against Burundi, ACTION AID, Feb. 1997; Eric Hoskins, The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions on Burundi, in POLITICAL GAIN & CIVILIAN
PAIN (Thomas Weiss et al. eds., 1997); Felicia Swindells, UN Sanctions in
Haiti: A Contradiction Under Articles 41 and 55 of the UN Charter, 20
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1878 (1997); ELIZABETH GIBBONS, SANCTIONS IN HAITI:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY UNDER ASSAULT (1999). For a similar, more
recent argument relative to Myanmar, see Michael Ewing-Chow, First Do No
Harm: Myanmar Trade Sanctions and Human Rights, 5 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS.
153, 153 80 (2007).
20. G.A. Res 51/103, ¶ 2 (Mar. 3, 1997). See also G.A. Res 52/120 (Feb. 23,
1998); G.A. Res 53/141 (Mar. 8, 1999); G.A. Res 54/172 (Feb. 15, 2000).
21. See S.C. Res. 713, ¶ 6 (Sept. 25, 1991); S.C. Res. 724, ¶ 5 (Dec. 15, 1991);
S.C. Res. 731 (Jan. 21, 1992); S.C. Res. 757, ¶ 5 (May 30, 1992); S.C. Res. 760
(June 18, 1992); S.C. Res. 787, ¶ 9 (Nov. 16, 1992); S.C. Res. 820, ¶ 21 (Apr. 17,
1993); S.C. Res. 883, ¶ 3 (Nov. 11, 1993); S.C. Res. 841, supra note 17, ¶ 8; S.C.
Res. 942, ¶ 7 (Sept. 22, 1994).
22. See S.C. Res. 820, supra note 21, ¶ 11.
23. See S.C. Res. 751 (Apr. 24, 1992) (concerning Somalia); S.C. Res. 788
(Nov. 19, 1992) (concerning Liberia); S.C. Res. 864 (Sept. 15, 1993) (concerning
Angola); S.C. Res. 918 (May 17, 1994) (concerning Rwanda); S.C. Res. 1132
(Oct. 8, 1997) (concerning Sierra Leone). See also S.C. Res. 1160 (Mar. 31, 1998)
(concerning Kosovo).
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worked to address by attaching expert groups to sanctions regimes, tasked with monitoring their implementation. The first
such group was created in 1995, charged with monitoring the
sanctions imposed on Rwanda.24
The use of targeted sanctions has increased dramatically from
the end of the 1990s on. A series of meetings and reports, aimed
at improving the international sanctions process across the
board, were key to this development.25 Sanctions regimes focused on the Taliban and al-Qaeda provided early illustrations
of the new, more dedicated commitment to targeted sanctions.26
In time, targeted sanctions would be applied in relation to numerous other situations of conflict and human rights violation
as well, as discussed further below.27
As the above brief summary attests, rights-based concerns
were not the only factor pushing towards the adoption of a more
targeted approach to sanctions; rather, the development of a
more targeted approach was also motivated by a desire to find
more effective measures through which to target non-state and
sub-state actors in particular. At the same time, the rights-based
critique of collectively-targeted sanctions in the 1990s was extremely powerful and achieved a high degree of public visibility,

24. See S.C. Res. 1013, ¶ 1 (Sept. 7, 1995).
25. 1997 was a key year, witnessing initial discussions relating to working
methods, implementation, and the functioning of sanctions on the whole. A
General Assembly resolution the same year highlighted similar themes, as well
as the importance of transparency and of considering the potential of adverse
humanitarian impacts. G.A. Res. 51/242, annex I, ¶ 2 (Sept. 26, 1997). The
following years saw several further efforts that helped to develop the sophistication of international sanctions regimes, with a series of sophisticated guidelines produced early in the 2000s in particular. See The Swiss Confederation,
U.N. Secretariat & Watson Inst. for Int’l Stud., Targeted Financial Sanctions:
A Manual for Design and Implementation Contributions from the Interlaken
Process (2001); Bonn Int’l Ctr. For Conversion, German Foreign Off. & U.N.
Secretariat, Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and
Aviation Related Sanctions: Results of the Bonn-Berlin Process’ (2001);
MAKING TARGETED SANCTIONS EFFECTIVE: GUIDELINES FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF UN POLICY OPTIONS (Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano
& Mikael Eriksson eds., 2003).
26. S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) & S.C. Res. 1333, at 2 (Dec. 19, 2000).
27. As one commentary observes, the majority of challenges to listing between 2006 and 2009 pertained to Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. See THOMAS BIERSTEKER & SUE ECKERT, ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO
TARGETED SANCTIONS: AN UPDATE OF THE WATSON REPORT’ 7 (2009).
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thereby serving as one among several factors pushing towards
the development of a more narrowly tailored approach.28
B. Rendering Targeted Sanctions Due-Process Compliant
Despite the role that rights-based concerns played in helping
to drive the development to targeted sanctions, it was the attacks of September 11, 2001 that imparted the most powerful
momentum to the development of targeted sanctions.29 In the
rapid deployment of targeted sanctions by the Security Council
and the United States that took place over the following years,
little to no thought was given to rights-based concerns.30
It would not be long, however, before rights advocates and lawyers began to mobilize in response. The move to targeted sanctions helped to place the entire global sanctions regime in a more
individualized frame. This, in turn, allowed for new challenges
from a more individual rights-focused angle, with the sweeping
28. That the rights-based criticisms were biting is demonstrated by a 1995
letter to the President of the Security Council from the US, UK, France, Russia
and China, calling for more targeted sanctions that would avoid unnecessary
suffering. Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/1995/300 (Apr. 13, 1995). The implications of rights-based concerns relative to the need to avoid overly-broad sanctions have continued to be explored and highlighted since; see, e.g., Amy Howlett, Getting Smart : Crafting Economic Sanctions that Respect Human
Rights, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199 (2004); U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts.,
Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, ¶ 25,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/88 (Mar. 9, 2007).
29. See, e.g., Rep. of the S.C., UN Sanctions, at 9 (Nov. 25, 2013),
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_sanctions_2013.pdf (“In
the wake of the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, the Council
greatly expanded its use of sanctions against individuals. . . .”).
30. See, e.g., Thomas Biersteker, Targeted Sanctions and Individual Human Rights, 65 INT’L J. 99, 102 (2010) (“In the weeks and months following the
attacks [of September 11, 2001] the Bush administration was eager to show
progress in its metaphorical war’ against terrorism. . . . One of the best indicators for demonstrating progress . . . was the addition of new names to the
UN list of individuals designated for supporting terrorism. The Treasury Department had a number of individuals already under suspicion of supporting
terrorism on its watch list. . . . [The] Treasury [Department] used this list to
add new names to the UN’s 1267 list. At the time . . . the global outpouring of
global sympathy for the US was such that there was very little scrutiny given
to the proposed additions. . . . The relative lack of due diligence in this rather
unusual period . . . laid the basis for many of the legal challenges that subsequently emerged in European courts. . . .”).
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new targeted sanctions regime being confronted on the basis of
its complete disregard for due process rights.31 Amongst other
things, rights advocates called for respect for the presumption of
innocence, listing procedures based upon evidence, notification
of those who were listed, and for the potential for listings to be
reviewed and challenged and for individuals or entities to be delisted if appropriate.
The result of such counter-pressure has been a long and gradual process of reform of the rules governing the process through
which targeted sanctions are imposed, and the introduction of
oversight mechanisms aimed at ensuring greater respect for due
process standards within the international targeted sanctions
regime as a whole. Early steps towards tempering the regime
included the introduction of humanitarian aid exemptions in
2001, the introduction of delisting procedures in 2002, and a
2004 Security Council resolution calling upon states to include
background information on persons and entities they were proposing to sanction.32
Pressure around due process issues peaked between 2004 and
2010. The report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, a body created in 2003 in order to analyze threats
and challenges to international peace and security, observed in
31. For an important early official articulation of standards, see Directorate
General of Human Rights, Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against
Terrorism, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (July 11, 2002). For early academic challenges
to targeted sanctions on rights grounds, see Peter Fitzgerald, If Property Rights
Were Treated Like Human Rights, They Could Never Get Away with This:
Blacklisting and Due Process in U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 73 (2000); Iain Cameron, European Union Anti-Terrorist Blacklisting, 3 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 255 (2003); Iain Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions,
Legal Safeguards, and the ECHR, 72 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 159 (2003); Matthew
Happold, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United
Nations, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 593 (2003); Per Cramer, Recent Swedish Experiences with Targeted UN Sanctions: The Erosion of Trust in the Security Council, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER STATES 85 (Erika de Wet
& Andre Nollkaemper eds., 2003); Peter Gutherie, Security Council Sanctions
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 491
(2005); Andrea Bianchi, Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s Anti-Terrorism Measures: The Quest for Legitimacy and Cohesion, 17 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 881 (2006); Rosemary Foot, The United Nations, Counter Terrorism,
and Human Rights: Institutional Adaptation and Embedded Ideas, 29 HUM.
RTS. Q. 489 (2007); E.J. Flynn, The Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 371 (2007).
32. S.C. Res. 1526, ¶ 17 (Jan. 30, 2004).
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2004 that “the way entities or individuals are added to the terrorist list maintained by the Council and the absence of review
or appeal for those listed raise serious accountability issues and
possibly violate fundamental human rights norms and conventions”33 a serious warning shot across the bow of the Security
Council targeted sanctions regime. Later, in 2005, the Commission on Human Rights decided to appoint a Special Rapporteur
focused on human rights and counterterrorism,34 who immediately set about calling for more rights-respecting standards, including calling for a tighter definition of terrorism.35 That same
year, a General Assembly resolution called on the Security
Council “to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing
them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions.”36 That
resolution led to an Office of Legal Affairs study, which determined that the Security Council is required to ensure that due
process rights are respected, and presented recommendations as
to steps that could be taken to reform the Security Council’s targeted sanctions process.37 In response to such mounting pressure, Security Council Resolution 1617, issued in July 2005, reiterated the requirement that background information be included whenever states submitted the names of individuals or
entities which they proposed should be added to the targeted
sanctions list, and further recommended that states should en-

33. Rep. of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 152, U.N. Doc. 1/59/656 (Dec.
2, 2004).
34. U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Resolution 2005/80 on Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/80 (Apr. 21, 2005).
35. See Martin Scheinin (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion & Protection
of Human Rights While Countering Terrorism), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/98 (Dec. 28, 2005).
36. G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶ 109 (Sept. 16, 2005).
37. See Bardo Fassbender, Targeted Sanctions and Due Process: The Responsibility of the UN Security Council to Ensure that Fair and Clear Procedures are Made Available to Individuals and Entities Targeted with Sanctions
Under
Chapter
VII
of
the
UN
Charter,
U.N.
(2006),
http://www.un.org/law/counsel/Fassbender_study.pdf. See also THOMAS
BIERSTEKER & SUE ECKERT, STRENGTHENING TARGETED SANCTIONS THROUGH
FAIR AND CLEAR PROCEDURES (2006).
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deavor to inform individuals and entities of the measures imposed on them and of the procedures for listing and delisting, in
the context of a greater sharing of information generally.38
The following year, Secretary-General Kofi Annan suggested
that persons against whom measures are taken must be informed of those measures, and the fundamentals of the case
upon which they were put in place, as soon as possible and to the
extent possible (recognizing concerns pertaining to the secrecy
of certain information).39 The paper also suggested that sanctioned persons be guaranteed the right to be represented by
council and heard within a reasonable time, that a focal point be
set up to coordinate such steps in practice, and that an independent and impartial review mechanism be set up and empowered
to provide effective remedies.40 Shortly thereafter, the Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism made a
series of recommendations pertaining to the sanctions process,
in which he called for sharper definitions, emphasized that sanctions must be proportionate, proposed the introduction of temporal limits on those sanctions put in place, and underscored the
importance of informing those who had been listed, ensuring
that they had access to review and that such review might lead
to the provision of appropriate remedies where necessary.41
Later that year, this accumulated pressure once again helped to
drive the Security Council to take another small step in response, by creating a focal point within the Secretariat empowered to receive delisting requests from states.42
Sharper challenges to the Security Council’s targeted sanctions regime would come through judicial challenges on the national and regional levels. Particularly significant was a 2008
decision of the European Court of Justice, Yassin Abdullah Kadi
38. S.C. Res. 1617, ¶¶ 4 6 (July 29, 2005). S.C. Res. 1735 (Dec. 22, 2006)
and S.C. Res. 1822 (June 30, 2008) would continue to push along the same
lines.
39. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated June 15, 2006 from the U.N. Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, Proceedings of 5475th
Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5474 (June 22, 2006).
40. Id.
41. Martin Scheinin (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion & Protection of
Human Rights While Countering Terrorism), Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, ¶¶ 30 40, U.N. Doc.
A/61/27 (Aug. 16, 2006).
42. S.C. Res. 1730 (Dec. 19, 2006).
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and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union & Commission of the European Communities, in
which the Court of Justice found that measures taken by the
European Union, in implementation of the Security Council’s
call for sanctions, had violated the principle of effective judicial
protection.43 In particular, the ruling found the measures
adopted failed to comply with the principle of effective judicial
protection insofar as they did not provide for a procedure
through which those who had been placed on the sanctions list
would be informed of the reasons behind their listing, nor for a
hearing in which listed individuals might challenge their listing.44
The Kadi judgment was a moment of high drama, in which the
European Court of Justice indirectly challenged the Security
Council. The judgment led to further due process-based reforms
of Security Council practice in the following years.45 Security
43. Case C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council of the Eur. Union, 2008
E.C.R. 1 06351.
44. Similar due process concerns were raised in a series of related cases concerning the Organisation des Modjahedines du people d’Iran,’ which the European Union had sanctioned on its own initiative. See Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du people d’Iran v. Council of the Eur. Union, 2006
E.C.R. II 04665; Case T-256/07, People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Council of
the Eur. Union, 2008 E.C.R. II 03019; and Case T-284/08, People’s Mojahedin
Org. of Iran v. Council of the Eur. Union, 2008 E.C.R. II 03487. The Human
Rights Committee decision in Sayadi also pointed in a similar direction. See
Hum. Rts. Comm., Sayadi v. Belgium, Commc’n No. 1472/2006 (Dec. 29, 2008).
Other similar cases include: Abdelrazik v. Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs), [2010] 1 F.C.R. 267, 2009 F.C. 580 (CanLII); Her Majesty’s Treasury v.
Ahmed, [2010] UKSC 2, (appeal taken from EWCA Civ 1187); Case T-85/09,
Kadi v. Eur. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. II 05177; Al-Jedda v. U.K., App. No.
27021/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011); and Nada v. Switzerland, App. No. 10593/08,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
45. Pressure for reform was kept up by an ongoing stream of criticism; see,
e.g., Assessing Damage, Urging Action: Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on
Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, INT’L COMM’N JURISTS
(2009), https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Report-on-TerrorismCounter-terrorism-and-Human-Rights-Eminent-Jurists-Panel-on-Terrorismseries-2009.pdf; BIERSTEKER, ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO TARGETED
SANCTIONS, supra note 27; David Cortright et al., Sanctions and Security Research Program, Human Rights and Targeted Sanctions: An Action Agenda for
Strengthening Due Process Procedures (Nov. 2009), https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Security_Council/Human_Rights_and_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf; Helen Keller & Andreas Fischer, The UN Anti-Terror Sanctions Regime Under Pressure, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 257 (2009); Devika Hovell, The Deliberative Deficit: Transparency, Access to Information and UN Sanctions, in
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Council Resolution 1904, issued in 2009, creating an Office of the
Ombudsperson, with certain oversight powers over the targeted
sanctions process.46 The Office of the Ombudsperson was further
strengthened in 201147 and 2012.48 While criticism has continued since then,49 leading to pressure for further reforms, attention to the issue has in general dimmed over recent years, in part
thanks to the due process-based reforms that have already taken
place.50

SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALISED WORLD (Jeremy Farrall & Kim Rubenstein eds., 2009); George Lopez et al., Overdue Process: Protecting Human Rights While Sanctioning Alleged Terrorists, JOAN B.
KROC INST. INT’L PEACE STUD. (2009); Monika Heupel, Multilateral Sanctions
Against Terror Suspects and the Violation of Due Process Standards, 85 INT’L
AFF. 307 (2009); Eckart Klein, International Sanctions from a Human Rights
Law Perspective: Some Observations on the Kadi Judgment of the European
Court of Justice, 4 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 111 (2009); David Cortright & Erika de Wet, Human Rights Standards for Targeted Sanctions,
SANCTIONS
&
SECURITY
RES.
PROGRAM
(2010),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242603593_Human_rights_standards_for_targeted_sanctions; Yvonne Terlingen, The United States and the UN’s Targeted
Sanctions of Suspected Terrorists: What Role for Human Rights?, 24 ETHICS &
INT’L AFF. 131 (2010); U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/16/50 (Dec. 15, 2010).
46. S.C. Res. 1904, ¶ 20 (Dec. 17, 2009). S.C. Res. 1904 ¶ 20 also continued
the gradual development of the reforms put forward in resolutions 1617, 1735
and 1822. Id.
47. S.C. Res. 1989, ¶ 21 (June 17, 2011).
48. S.C. Res. 2083, ¶ 22 (Dec. 17, 2012).
49. See, e.g., Isaac Kfir, A Regime in Need of Balance: The UN Counter-Terrorism Regimes of Security and Human Rights, 4 NAT’L SEC. & ARMED
CONFLICT L. REV. 7 (2014); Jared Genser & Kate Barth, Targeted Sanctions
and Due Process of Law, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE AGE
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Jared Genser & Bruno Stagno Ugarte eds., 2014); William
Bartholomew, A Due Process Balancing Act: The United States’ Influence on
the UN al-Qaeda Sanctions Regime, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 737 (2015); High
Level Rev. of U.N. Sanctions, Compendium of the High Level Review of United
Nations
Sanctions,
U.N.
(Nov.
2015),
http://www.hlr-unsanctions.org/HLR_Compendium_2015.pdf.
50. The impact of years of pressure is also indicated by the fact that the
website of the Security Council itself declares that “The Council applies sanctions with ever-increasing cognizance of the rights of those targeted.” See Sanctions Committee Information: Sanctions, U.N., https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
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C. Conclusion
The use of sanctions expanded rapidly in the post-Cold War
world. Despite the fact that this era of sanctions is not yet three
decades old, dramatic changes in the manner in which sanctions
have been shaped and deployed have already taken place. Over
the course of the 1990s, a gradual shift from general to targeted
sanctions took place, spurred both by the need to target substate and nonstate actors, and by rights-based critiques of the
devastating consequences of collective sanctions. Targeted sanctions, in turn, prompted a new form of rights-based critique, as
the discretionary manner in which those sanctions were first implemented and applied was increasingly challenged on due process grounds, leading to a series of procedural reforms.
None of this is to suggest all sanctions are now compliant with
these two sources of challenge; rather, collective sanctions continue to be imposed, and due process concerns are often not given
the weight they are due. What is clear, however, is that in contrast to the suppositions of realist thinkers, rights-based concerns have already proven their ability to influence even such a
significant area of international affairs as sanctions policy,
where they have already led to several clearly observable
changes.
These have not been the only changes underway in terms of
the relation between public international law and sanctions,
however. The following sections consider a third manner in
which rights-based concerns have been seeping into the law of
sanctions. The process in question has been both more gradual
and subtler; at the same time, it is also potentially more momentous.
II. THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
The previous section considered a few of the most apparent
and significant ways in which rights-based concerns have intruded on the law of sanctions in recent years relative to the
scope of sanctions, the manner in which targets are chosen and
the rights and recourses afforded to those targeted. All those developments occurred in relationship to the rights of those
against whom sanctions are imposed. The relationship between
rights and sanctions, however, does not only apply to the negative effects sanctions may have. The absence of sanctions is not
an absence of a relationship; rather, there are innumerable ways
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in which states and individuals interact with one another. In
some instances, those relationships may also lead in rights violations. The question relative to such cases, therefore, is whether
there are situations in which certain forms of economic relationship, or other forms of support, should be cut off? In other words,
are there certain instances in which sanctions understood in
this context as an umbrella term, referring to any potential cessation of economic or other forms of interaction are required?
This section considers the manner in which four discrete yet
interrelated bodies of public international law human rights
law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law
and general international law have dealt with the issue of obligations arising from transnational harms. The discussion below highlights the manner in which understandings of the scope
of responsibility in all four areas of law have been expanding
over the last several decades, leading to a growing recognition of
the need to impose limits on various forms of support in response
to the most serious instances of harm and human suffering.
Historically, the scope of transnational responsibility within
international law has been limited. This limitation may be
traced to many factors. Amongst the more overt historical
demonstrations of resistance to a more encompassing vision of
responsibility was the insistence, primarily on the part of the
United Kingdom, that a clause limiting the applicability of the
rights in the European Convention on Human Rights be inserted
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into the draft text.51 This clause made it to the final text as Article 63.52
The scope of this historic limitation is diminishing, however.
In a particularly shameless episode, some sixty years after it had
worked to insert the colonial limitation into the European Convention, the United Kingdom attempted to rely upon this provision in order to avoid responsibility in the Al-Skeini and Others
v. the United Kingdom.53 Fortunately, the European Court of
Human Rights was in no mood to accept the British argument,
observing curtly that “[t]he existence of [the Article 56] mechanism, which was included in the Convention for historical reasons, cannot be interpreted in present conditions as limiting the
scope of the term jurisdiction’ in Article 1.”54 In doing so, the
Court indicated its willingness to employ a more extensive understanding of international responsibility.55
51. See Council of Europe, COLLECTED EDITION OF THE TRAVAUX
PREPARATOIRES’ OF THE ECHR Vol. IV 270 (Arthur Robertson ed., 1975 85);
MARCO DURANTI, THE CONSERVATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION: EUROPEAN
IDENTITY, TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION 203 (2017). The Belgians and the French supported inclusion of
the clause. A scathing response to this decision came from Leopold Senghor,
the future President of Senegal and a member of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe at the time:
In effect, Article 63 appears to be a rather clumsy way of excluding overseas territories from the Convention. It therefore
appears to me to be an echo of the Colonial Pact. . . . In adopting Article 63 the Assembly would transform the European
Declaration of Human Rights into a Declaration of European
Human Rights. This would be to deny the same rights to
other men. This would mean betraying the spirit of European
Civilisation which as Valéry has written made man the
measure of all things. . . .’
European Consultative Assembly, Second Session of the Consultative Assembly
(Aug. 7 28, 1950), reprinted in 6 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTED EDITION OF
THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 2, 172 77 (1985).
52. It forms Article 56 of the current text.
53. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011)
[hereinafter Al-Skeini] (concerning the killing of six Iraqi civilians in 2003, and
the inadequacies of the investigation process subsequently set up).
54. Id. ¶ 140.
55. For more on Al-Skeini’s impact, see Barbara Miltner, Revisiting Extraterritoriality After Al-Skeini: The ECHR and its Lessons, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L.
693 (2012).
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The discussion below highlights two different manners in
which understandings of the scope of responsibility have been
growing. First, there has been increased attention to positive obligations, such as the obligation under Common Article 1 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, requiring
that states work to ensure all parties to a conflict respect the
rules of international humanitarian law.56 Second, there has
also been increased recognition of the ways in which direct responsibility overflows the narrow boundaries within which it
has more traditionally been confined. This is demonstrated both
by the growing emphasis on extraterritorial responsibility in human rights law,57 as well as by the emphasis on complicity in
international criminal law.58
The regimes discussed below are still contested. The point here
is not to suggest otherwise; on the contrary, it is taken as evident
that international law is defined by tensions between different
points of view, at times motivated by political calculations and
alignments, and at times by more normative concerns.59 While

56. See, e.g., Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Common
Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions Revisited: Protecting Collective Interests,
82 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 67 (2000); Tomasz Zych, The Scope of the Obligation
to Respect and to Ensure Respect for International Humanitarian Law, 27
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 251 (2009); Knut Dörmann & Jose Serralvo,
Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the Obligation to Prevent International Humanitarian Law Violations, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 707 (2015).
57. See, e.g., EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
(Fons Coomans & Menno Kamminga eds., 2004); MICHAL GONDEK, THE REACH
OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD: EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2009); MARK GIBNEY & SIGRUN SKOGLY, UNIVERSAL
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS (2010); MARKO MILANOVIC,
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES
AND POLICY (2011).
58. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (Sept. 2,
1998); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case
No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 61 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
June 25, 1999); Prosecutor v. Naser Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, ¶
282 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006); Prosecutor v.
Milan Milutinovi, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, ¶ 92 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL03-01-A, Judgment (Sept. 26, 2013).
59. Tensions famously explored in MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO
UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (REISSUE WITH
NEW EPILOGUE) (2006).
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from a more general perspective international law may be perpetually contested, on the level of concrete detail significant
shifts and developments in the nature of law and practice frequently take place. The growing strength and volume of rules
pertaining to international responsibility, discussed below, represents one such significant shift.
General international law, international humanitarian law,
international criminal law and international human rights law
may be discrete regimes, but they are all closely interconnected
as well.60 The intent of considering each area of law separately
below is not to deny these interconnections, but rather to highlight in more detail the changes that have been taking place in
each area of law. Developments in all four areas reinforce each
other, however, and may all be taken as testimony of a broader
movement towards greater recognition of extraterritorial and
transnational responsibility.
A. Human Rights Law
Within human rights law, the question of international responsibility has primarily been addressed through considerations of extraterritorial rights obligations. Recognition of extraterritorial rights obligations has been growing over recent decades. The language of Article 2(1) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has been key to debates
around extraterritorial obligations. That article stipulates that
the human rights obligations in the Covenant will apply with
respect “to all individuals within [a state’s] territory and subject
to its jurisdiction.”61 An early interpretation of Article 2(1) came
in the Human Rights Committee’s decision in Delia Saldias de
Lopez v. Uruguay.62 In that case, the Committee stipulated that
Article 2(1) of the Covenant places an obligation upon a State
party to respect and to ensure rights “to all individuals within

60. As recognized by various international tribunals; for one such recognition, see Ilascu v. Moldova, App. No. 48787/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 312 (2004)
[hereinafter Ilascu].
61. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
62. U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee [HRC], Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay,
Comm. No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (July 29, 1981), available
at http://www.refworld.org/cases,HRC,4028d4954.html [hereinafter Delia
Saldias].
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its territory and subject to its jurisdiction,” but it does not imply that the State party concerned cannot be held accountable
for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents
commit upon the territory of another State, whether with the
acquiescence of the Government of that State or in opposition
to it.63

The approach of Delia Saldias was emulated and expanded
upon by the European Court of Human Right’s judgment on preliminary objections in Loizidou v. Turkey.64 In Loizidou, the
Court found that
Bearing in mind the object and purpose of the Convention, the
responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a
consequence of military action whether lawful or unlawful
it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and
freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of
such control whether it be exercised directly, through its armed
forces, or through a subordinate local administration.65

The judgment, in short, both referenced a broad, effectivitybased approach to interpretation, and also gave further shape to
the idea of jurisdiction’ by linking it to the notion of control.’
63. Id. ¶ 12. The Committee continued by referring to Article 5(1) of the
Covenant, which stipulates:
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in
any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of
any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.
ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 5(1). Relative to this clause, the Committee observed, “In line with this, it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under Article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.” Delia Saldias, supra note
62, ¶ 12.
64. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Eur. Ct. H.R., (1995) [hereinafter Loizidou]. The language pertaining to
the scope of the European Convention’s obligations is similar to that of the
ICCPR, as Article 1 of the European Convention states that states parties must
“secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined
in . . . this Convention.” European Convention on Human Rights art. 1, Nov. 4,
1950, E.T.S 5.
65. Loizidou, supra note 64, ¶ 62.
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A similar approach was employed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,66 and further confirmed in the ICCPR
context by the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment
31.67 Moreover, this line of reasoning was furthered in the European context by Al-Skeini, as referenced above.68
While this strand of reasoning expanded understandings of extraterritorial responsibility, it did so in relatively straightforward terms, relative to situations in which states or state agents
were more directly involved in committing extraterritorial rights
violations. Another strand of rights jurisprudence has gone a
step further. This strand of jurisprudence has broadened the potential for states to be held responsible for extraterritorial rights
violations, by contemplating more indirect forms of responsibility. Key to the formation of this strand was jurisprudence pertaining to the expulsion of refugees, in which the responsibility
of the expelling state hinged upon the nature of the actions of
the state to which the individual in question was being expelled.69 A key articulation of this broader standard also came in
66. See Saldano v. Argentina, Petition, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
38/99, OAE/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 19 (2000).
67. U.N. HRC, General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶¶ 10 12, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant]. See also
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties Under Article 2
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28 (Dec. 16, 2010), available at
https://undocs.org/CEDAW/C/GC/28 [hereinafter CEDAW General Recommendation No. 28].
68. Al-Skeini, supra note 53, ¶¶ 130 40 (highlighting a variety of ways in
which states’ obligations can apply beyond their territory, including through
the actions of their agents, or on the basis of their exercise of de facto control
of territory).
69. See Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶
85 91 (1989) [hereinafter Soering]; Cruz Varas v. Sweden, App. No. 15576/89,
Eur. Comm’n. H.R. at ¶¶ 80 81 (1991); Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom, App.
Nos. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87 & 13448/87, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1991).
See also U.N. HRC, A.R.J. v. Australia, ¶ 6.9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996
(Aug.
11,
1997),
available
at
http://www.refworld.org/cases,HRC,4028adfa7.html; U.N. HRC, Roger Judge v. Canada,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (Aug. 13, 2003), available at http://undocs.org/CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998; U.N. HRC, Alzery v. Sweden, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Oct. 25, 2006), available at http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/1416-2005.html.
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Loizidou, in which the European Court highlighted that “the responsibility of Contracting Parties can be involved because of
acts of their authorities, whether performed within or outside
national boundaries, which produce effects outside their own
territory.”70 By referring to the effects’ of state action, the Loizidou judgment suggested that extraterritorial state responsibility may have a broad scope.
The precise scope of effects-based extraterritorial liability in
human rights law remains unclear. The European Court’s earlier judgment in Soering v. the United Kingdom indicated several of the key concepts that might be used to flesh out the parameters of such responsibility, highlighting the interrelated notions of the proximity of the consequences, foreseeability of the
harms, and the question of whether or not the actor in question
had knowledge or substantial grounds for believing that a rights
violation might flow from their acts.71 Reference to such terms
has been reiterated in subsequent cases. In Ilascu and Others v.
Moldova and Russia, the European Court of Human Rights
highlighted that effects must be “sufficiently proximate” in order
for responsibility to attach.72 In Munaf v. Romania, the Human
Rights Committee highlighted that responsibility will apply
where an extraterritorial violation is “a necessary and foreseeable consequence [as] judged on the knowledge the state party
had at the time.”73 Decisions by the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW
Committee”) have followed a similar line of reasoning.74 In its
28th General Comment, moreover, the CEDAW Committee stipulated that states’ anti-discrimination efforts must not only combat national acts of discrimination, but rather that they must

70. Loizidou, supra note 64, ¶ 62. See also Saldano v. Argentina, supra note
66, ¶ 17; CEDAW General Recommendation No. 28, supra note 67, ¶ 12.
71. Soering, supra note 69, ¶¶ 85, 86, 88, 90.
72. Ilascu, supra note 60, ¶ 317.
73. U.N.
HRC,
Munaf
v.
Romania,
¶
14.2,
U.N.
Doc.
CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006 (Aug. 21, 2009), available at http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/278952/CCPR_C_96_D_1539_2006EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
74. See, e.g., M.N.N. v. Denmark, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/55/D/33/2011 (July
15, 2011), available at https://undocs.org/CEDAW/C/55/D/33/2011; Y.W. v.
Denmark, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/60/D/51/2013 (Mar. 2, 2015), available at
http://undocs.org/CEDAW/C/60/D/51/2013.
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“also extend to acts of national corporations operating extraterritorially.”75 The CEDAW Committee has also applied an effectsbased test in the context of the extraterritorial effects of financial secrecy rules.76
Insofar as the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) pertains to general international law, it is discussed
further below. In a number of its cases the ICJ has referred to
human rights law specifically, however, and in doing so has lent
support for a wider understanding of the scope of extraterritorial
obligations within human rights law. In its Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall advisory opinion, the ICJ supported
the control test by finding that the ICCPR, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) should all
be understood to apply to areas and acts under a state’s control.77
At the same time, the ICJ also supported the effects test, when
it observed, relative to the ICESCR in particular, that it placed
Israel “under an obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those fields where competence has been
transferred to Palestinian authorities.”78
The above points of reference, taken together, highlight the expanding scope of extraterritorial obligations within human
rights law over recent decades, indicating increased attention on
75. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 28, supra note 67, ¶ 36.
76. See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports
of Switzerland, ¶ 40(c), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHE/CO/4-5 (Nov. 25, 2016) (finding that “financial secrecy policies and [restrictive] rules on corporate reporting
and taxation . . . potentially [have a] negative impact on the ability of other
States, in particular those already short of revenue, to mobilize the maximum
available resources for the fulfillment of women’s rights”).
77. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶¶ 107 14 (July 9)
[hereinafter Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall]. See also Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168 (Dec. 19). In its Application of the International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination decision,
meanwhile, the ICJ asserting a particularly broad version of the control test,
observing that states should “do all in their power to ensure that public authorities and public institutions under their control or influence do not engage”
in rights violations. See Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Provisional
Measures Order, 2008 I.C.J. Rep. 353, ¶ 149(4) (Oct. 15).
78. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 77, ¶ 112.
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the part of human rights actors to transnational rights violations and an increased willingness on the part of rights adjudicatory bodies to adopt progressive approaches to such issues.79
While the development of the control test represents a positive
trend in such a direction in its own right, the development of the
effects test suggests an even broader scope of obligation, and one
that may continue to expand in years to come.
B. International Humanitarian Law
Considerations of expanded notions of international responsibility within international humanitarian law have taken place
in a number of different areas.80 First, the scope of international
responsibility has been advanced through reference to positive
obligations. Key here is Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol I thereto, which requires
that the contracting parties “undertake to respect and to ensure
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”81 The
79. Attention to the issue on the academic plane has also increased: see, e.g.,
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (Fons Coomans &
Menno Kamminga eds., 2004); MICHAL GONDEK, THE REACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD: EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES (2009); MARK GIBNEY & SIGRUN SKOGLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL
OBLIGATIONS
(2010);
MARKO
MILANOVIC,
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES
AND POLICY (2011).
80. Humanitarian law was, moreover, already a key resource for pushing
back against overly broad sanctions, thanks to its prohibition of starvation,
and requirement that foodstuffs, medical supplies and other necessities be allowed to pass freely (see Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1969, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 54, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 65, Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Declaration on Minimum Humanitarian Standards
art. 3, ¶ 2(f), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/55 (Dec. 2, 1990); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War IV art. 23,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287). The need to avoid overly broad, collective sanctions could also be understood as flowing from international humanitarian
law’s prohibition of collective punishment, intimidation and terrorism (see Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
IV art. 33, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention (IV) Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 50, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S.
539).
81. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention) art.
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practical implications of this obligation were developed by the
Nicaragua decision of the International Court of Justice, where
the Court found that Common Article 1 places states “under an
obligation not to encourage persons or groups engaged in . . .
conflict . . . to act in violation of the provisions of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.”82 Subsequent ICJ
cases have gone further, by emphasizing the positive side of the
obligation flowing from Article 1. In its advisory opinion Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ observed, “It follows [from Article 1]
that every State party to [the Geneva Conventions], whether or
not it is a party to a specific conflict, is under an obligation to
ensure that the requirements of the instruments in question are
complied with.”83 Customary international humanitarian law
has been understood to require the same.84 Indeed, the publication of the International Committee of the Red Cross’s compendium on customary international humanitarian law in 2005 may
be taken as an important milestone in its own right in terms of
reaffirming this obligation.85 The positive obligation to ensure
respect for the laws of war flowing from Article 1 has also been

1, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention) art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third
Geneva Convention) art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva
Convention) art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 80, art. 1.
82. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 220 (June 27). See also INT’L COMM.
OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
ch. 40, ¶ 129 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
83. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 77, ¶ 158.
See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), supra note 77, ¶¶ 211, 345. For further relevant jurisprudence, see
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 517 19 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000).
84. See ICRC, 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note
82, ch. 41.
85. ICRC, 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 82.
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extensively emphasized in various United Nations reports and
resolutions,86 as well as in the scholarly literature.87

86. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary General, Report Submitted to the Security
Council by the Secretary-General in Accordance with Resolution 605 (1987), ¶¶
24 27, U.N. Doc. S/19443 (Jan. 21, 1988); U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion
and Protection of Hum. Rts., Res. 1990/12, ¶ 4 (Aug. 30, 1990). For recognition
of the obligation by other international organizations, see, e.g., North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly, Civilian Aff. Comm. Res. No.
287, ¶ 7 (Nov. 15, 1999); Rep. of the ICRC, International Humanitarian Law
and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts 47 (Sept. 2003); Updated
European Union Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL), 2009 O.J. (C 303) 12. On the obligation’s applicability
to the conflict in Yemen that began in 2015, see Panel of Experts on Yemen,
Letter dated Jan. 27, 2017 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to
the President of the Security Council, ¶ 129, U.N. Doc. S/2017/81 (Jan. 31,
2017).
87. See, e.g., Hans-Peter Gasser, Ensuring Respect for the Geneva Conventions and Protocols: The Role of the Third States and the United Nations, in
EFFECTING COMPLIANCE (Hazel Fox & Michael Meyer eds., 1993); Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Common Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions Revisited: Protecting Collective Interests, 82 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
67 (2000); Toni Pfanner, Various Mechanisms and Approaches for Implementing International Humanitarian Law and Protecting and Assisting War Victims, 91 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 305 (2009); Tomasz Zych, The Scope of the Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for International Humanitarian Law,
27 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 251 (2009); U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Informal Meeting of the General Assembly on the
Humanitarian Situation in Syria (Feb. 25, 2014); Knut Dörmann & Jose Serralvo, Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the Obligation to Prevent International Humanitarian Law Violations, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 707
(2015). The greater prevalence of the argument as to the scope of the positive
obligation flowing from Article 1 as of the mid-2010s was demonstrated by
United States legal advisor Brian Egan’s feeling the need to speak directly
against it in 2016. Egan observed:
Some have argued that the obligation in Common Article 1 of
the Geneva Conventions to “ensure respect” for the Conventions legally requires us to undertake such steps and more
vis-à-vis not only our partners, but all States and non-State
actors engaged in armed conflict. Although we do not share
this expansive interpretation of Common Article 1, as a matter of policy, we always seek to promote adherence to the law
of armed conflict generally and encourage other States to do
the same.
Brian Egan, International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign: Some Observations, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 235, 245 (2016).
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Second, in addition to their obligation to encourage parties to
conflicts to respect the rules of international humanitarian law,
states must of course respect international humanitarian law
whenever they are taking part in hostilities themselves. At what
point exactly a state should be understood as being involved in
hostilities is a complex and contested question, however.88 Here
too, understandings have evolved, with recent sources suggesting a broader scope as to when states might be adjudged engaged
in a conflict than would traditionally have been recognized.89
Agreement on the Arms Trade Treaty presents a particularly
tangible crystallization of norms in this area.90 The process that
would lead up to agreement on the treaty began at a 1998 meeting in Oslo.91 Numerous regional commitments to work to control the flows of arms came in the following years.92 In 2006, the

88. See Nathalie Weizmann, Why U.S. Being a Party to Armed Conflict in
Afghanistan May Not End Soon, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 7, 2015),
https://www.justsecurity.org/18904/u-s-forces-transition-drawdown-afghanistan/ (“International law is not well developed on the question of when a state
becomes, or ceases to be, a party to an ongoing armed conflict”).
89. See Tristan Ferraro, The Applicability and Application of International
Humanitarian Law to Multinational Forces, 95 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 561
(2013); Weizmann, Why U.S. Being a Party to Armed Conflict in Afghanistan
May Not End Soon, supra note 88; Nathalie Weizmann, International Law on
the Saudi-Led Military Operations in Yemen, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 27, 2015),
https://www.justsecurity.org/21524/international-law-saudi-operation-stormresolve-yemen/; Nathalie Weizmann, Are the U.S. and U.K. Parties to the
Saudi-Led Armed Conflict Against the Houthis in Yemen?, JUST SECURITY
(Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/33095/u-s-u-k-parties-saudi-ledarmed-conflict-houthis-yemen/.
90. For some academic background, see ICRC, ARMS AVAILABILITY AND THE
SITUATION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT (1999); Alexandra Boivin, Complicity and Beyond: International Law and the Transfer of Small Arms and Lights
Weapons, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 467, 476 78 (2005); DENISE GARCIA, SMALL
ARMS AND SECURITY: NEW EMERGING INTERNATIONAL NORMS (2006); ZERAY
YIHDEGO, THE ARMS TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007); Theresa A. DiPerna, Small Arms and Light Weapons: Complicity With a View Toward Extended State Responsibility, 20 FLA. J. INT’L L. 25, 38 41 (2008); Maya Brehm,
The Arms Trade and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and
Human Rights Law, 12 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 375 (2008).
91. An International Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Elements
of a Common Understanding
Concerns and Challenges, Oslo, July 13 14,
1998, cited in GARCIA, supra note 90, at 46 58.
92. See, e.g., Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit
Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of
Africa (Mar. 15, 2000); OAS, Model Regulations for the Control of Brokers of
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General Assembly called for the creation of a group of experts to
study the potential for a legally binding convention on conventional arms transfers.93 Finally, the Arms Trade Treaty was
adopted by the General Assembly in 2013.94 Among other significant features, the treaty sets out a due diligence standard relative to arms exports, while further highlighting that no arms
transfers may be authorized should a state be aware that weapons would be used in the commission of violations of international criminal law.95 In doing so, the treaty has helped to extend
notions of complicity in international law.96
C. International Criminal Law
International criminal law, too, has contributed to the growing
recognition of transnational and international responsibility relative to the worst sorts of rights violations in a number of ways.
In the first place, international criminal tribunals have affirmed
the notion of jus cogens on several occasions, highlighting that
“most norms of international humanitarian law, in particular
those prohibiting war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, are also peremptory norms of international law of jus cogens, i.e. of a non-derogable and overriding character.”97 The development of international criminal law has thus been key in
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (2003); Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (Apr. 21, 2004); Org. for
Security & Co-operation in Eur. [OSCE], Document on Small Arms and Lights
Weapons, OSCE Doc. FSC.DOC/1/00/Rev.1 (Nov. 24, 2004); Best Practice
Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi
Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Regional Centre on Small Arms
and Light Weapons (2005); Econ. Community of W. Afr. States [ECOWAS],
Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other
Related Materials (2006).
93. G.A. Res. 61/89 (Dec. 18, 2006).
94. G.A. Res. 67/234 (Apr. 2, 2013).
95. Id. arts. 6(3), 7.
96. The treaty was relied upon to such effect in Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra
note 58. In addition to the Arms Trade Treaty, the judgment in the Taylor case
also relied on the Leahy law (discussed further below) in support of a
knowledge standard rather than an intent standard for complicity, highlighting the fluid connections between various areas of law and legal instruments
pertaining to complicity.
97. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 83, ¶ 520. See also Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, supra note 58; Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1,
Judgment, ¶ 88 (May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T,
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providing support for the general notion of jus cogens, which has
also been developed through general international law, as discussed further below.
More concretely, international criminal law has laid out clear,
forceful standards on complicity, which apply with little to no
regard to international borders. Individuals are complicit under
the terms of customary international criminal law where they
take an action that has a substantial effect on the commission of
a crime,98 with knowledge of the substantial likelihood that their
conduct will assist in such commission.99
The knowledge of substantial likelihood’ mens rea standard
advanced by international criminal law in this context is particularly important. This standard is more clearly assertive than
that developed in the context of state responsibility, where the
question of whether a more stringent intent standard or a
broader knowledge standard is required has been extensively debated.100 The fact that a more extensive standard has developed
Judgment, ¶ 500 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003);
Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-98-42, Judgment, ¶ 2136 (Dec.
14, 2015).
98. See U.N. War Crimes Commission, The Zyklon B Case: Trial of Bruno
Tesch and Two Others, in 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93
(1947); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 58; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, supra
note 58; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, supra note 58, ¶ 61; Prosecutor v. Naser
Oric, supra note 58, ¶ 282; Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinovi, supra note 58, ¶ 92;
Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 58.
It is worth observing that even moral support and encouragement have been
held to potentially constitute substantial assistance by international criminal
tribunals, demonstrating the impetus towards broad interpretation operating
in such a context. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 58, ¶ 692; Prosecutor
v. Furundzija, supra note 58, ¶¶ 207 09; Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 58.
99. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, supra note 58; Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra
note 58. The language of the Rome Statute potentially suggests a stricter mens
rea standard, but is yet to be conclusively interpreted.
100. On which see, e.g., Vaughan Lowe, Responsibility for the Conduct of
Other States, 101 JAPANESE J. INT’L L. & DIPLOMACY 1 (2002); HELMUT AUST,
COMPLICITY AND THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 230 49 (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2011); Ryan Goodman & Miles Jackson, State Responsibility for Assistance to Foreign Forces (aka How to Assess US-UK Support for Saudi Ops in
Yemen),
JUST SECURITY
(Aug.
31,
2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/32628/state-responsibility-assistance-foreign-forces-a-k-a-assess-usuk-support-saudi-military-ops-yemen/; See Harriet Moynihan, Aiding and Assisting: Challenges in Armed Conflict and Counterterrorism, CHATHAM HOUSE
RES. PAPER (Nov. 2016), https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/aidingand-assisting-challenges-armed-conflict-and-counterterrorism.
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in the international criminal law context is surprising, given
that criminal liability is generally understood as the most serious form of liability, in the context of which the strictest standards should be applied. At the same time, as a practical and political matter, it is understandable that a stronger standard has
developed in the international criminal context, given the general lack of sympathy for the internationally criminally accused.101 The stronger standard recognized in the international
criminal context may logically be taken to apply to state responsibility as well, however given that it is the standard that governs the liability of state agents, and where a state agent is liable, the state on behalf of which they act will be as well.102
Perhaps most significantly, international criminal law has
played an important role within the constellation of public international legal regimes simply by attaching responsibility for violations of international law directly to individuals. As the Nuremberg Tribunal famously put it, “Crimes against international
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”103 The evolution of targeted sanctions has had a close interaction with this development. As one commentator has stated,
The evolution of targeted sanctions represents a trend towards
the personalization and individualization of measures in the
field of peace and security, a development mostly visible in the
rise of ad-hoc international tribunals to deal with war crimes

101. On the interstate level, by contrast, states have been more aware of the
potential that a stronger complicity standard might be applied to their own
actions and have hence pushed against it. The United States has been particularly active on this question, pushing firmly in favor of the intent standard in
the context of discussions on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. See
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY
COMMENTS
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Mar. 1, 2001).
102. For a similar point, see Miles Jackson, Aiding and Assisting: The Relationship with International Criminal Law, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 15, 2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/34441/chatham-houses-paper-aiding-assistinginternational-criminal-law/.
103. THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERG GERMANY, PART 22,
at 447 (1950). As Hersch Lauterpacht similarly put it, “unless responsibility is
imputed and attached to persons of flesh and blood, it rests with no one.”
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 40 (F.A. Praeger, 1950).
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such as the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda, the
special tribunal for Cambodia, and the International Criminal
Court.104

In short, the movement towards individual responsibility exemplified by international criminal law may be taken as one
background force that has helped to enable the move towards
more targeted sanctions,105 while more targeted sanctions may,
in turn, be taken as another piece of evidence of the movement
of international law towards a more individualized, and thanks
to that more law-governed, direction.106

104. Clara Portela, National Implementation of United Nations Sanctions:
Towards Fragmentation, 65 INT’L J. 13, 17 (2010). In the words of another commentator:
it is also important to reassess the place and ethics of sanctions in an international legal system which is giving increased importance to the individual. For developments in international law enforcement have also taken off in another
direction, in moving towards the institutionalization of individual criminal responsibility. This pierces another corporate
veil: the fiction of the monolithic state and the traditional position that it is responsible for all acts imputable to it which
are committed within its territory. This is a development
that, in certain cases, may well be preferable to holding entire
populations accountable for the acts of their leaders, as the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg recognized
some time ago.
Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Introduction, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 28 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001).
105. In this sense, the well-documented collapse of the language of state
criminality’ in the context of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility may be
seen, rather than as a diminishment of international responsibility, as further
recognition of the importance of attaching the most serious sanctions to individuals, rather than to states. For more on the history of the idea of state criminality in the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, see INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
OF STATES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC’S DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY (Joseph Weiler, Antonio Cassese & Marina Spinedi eds., 1989).
106. A key underlying point to highlight here, however, is the extent to which
international criminal responsibility despite its greater force, on some
measures has been far more extensively developed than international financial responsibility. One exception has been the regime generated by and
through the Alien Tort Statute, which, for that very reason, is worthy of wider
dissemination and utilization.

232

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:1

D. General International Law
The previous sections have considered several manners in
which the content of the rules concerning the international and
transnational responsibility of both states and individuals has
been gradually thickening over the past several decades, within
the three human-oriented subfields of international law: international human rights law, international humanitarian law,
and international criminal law. While these bodies of law do not
use the language of sanctions’, they impose obligations on states
and individuals not to engage in certain forms of cross-border
activity, thereby substantively requiring what in another lexicon
would readily be termed sanctions.
This section turns to consider the position of general international law on the matter. This position is not distinct from the
positions taken within the three subfields of international law
discussed above, but rather has been, in significant part, made
up of and informed by the legal standards that have developed
in each of those areas.
There are multiple instances in which general international
law might be taken to imply one sort of duty to sanction or another. This article is only concerned with a subset of those instances, however those which apply relative to the most serious sorts of violations. It is necessary in the first place, therefore,
to explore in basic outline the historical evolution of the idea of
higher order obligations within international law.
Higher order obligations in general international law have
come to be referred to as jus cogens obligations. The origin of the
idea of jus cogens obligations has been much debated.107 Some
trace the concept to the idea of jus strictum in Roman law, while
others point to the natural law ideas of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.108 More recently, some trace the idea to the
107. For more, see Martti Koskenniemi, Study Group of the Int’l Law
Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law ¶ 361, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/1L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Fragmentation Report]; Dire Tladi
(Special Rapporteur on Jus Cogens), First Report on Jus Cogens, ¶¶ 18 27,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/693 (Mar. 8, 2016).
108. See, e.g., MAX KASER, DAS ROMISCHE PRIVATRECHT, ERSTER ABSCHNITT:
DAS ALTROMISCHE, DAS VORKLASSISCHE UND KLASSICHE RECHT 198 (2nd ed.,
1971); Eric Suy, The Concept of Jus Cogens in Public International Law, in 2
THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17, 19 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967).
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rule in the Napoleonic Codes that laws which conflict with ordre
public (“public order”) and public policy objectives will be null,
while others credit the nineteenth century Pandectists.109 A
1937 article by Alfred Verdross, the prominent Austrian jurist
and member of the International Law Commission (ILC), is cited
in a great deal of the literature as playing a key role in originating the term jus cogens,110 though earlier references in the 1930s
can be found as well.111 In a broader, normative sense, the inhumanity of the Second World War helped to encourage the development of the idea of jus cogens,112 just as it helped lead to the
development of the modern human rights and international
criminal law regimes.
A key early statement by the ICJ came in United Kingdom v.
Albania, known as the Corfu Channel case, in which the Court
observed that “elementary considerations of humanity” serve as
the source of certain state obligations.113 The Genocide Convention, which came shortly thereafter, represented an important,
early treaty law crystallization of the notion of higher-order, humanist-inspired obligations in the post-World War II order.114 As
the ICJ would observe in its decision concerning the Genocide

109. Id.
110. Alfred Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM. J.
INT’L L. 571 (1937); see also Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens
in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT’L L. 55 (1966); Bruno Simma, The Contribution of Alfred Verdross to the Theory of International Law, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L.
33, 51 (1995).
111. Aust highlights August Freiherr von der Heydte, Die Erscheinungsformen des zwischenstaatlichen Rechts: jus cogens und jus dispositivum im
Völkerrect, 16 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VÖLKERRECHT 461 (1932), cited in AUST, supra
note 100, at 321 n. 8. See also Ernest Lorenz, Commercial Arbitration
International and Interstate Aspects, 42 YALE L.J. 716 (1934), cited in Paul Stephan,
The Political Economy of Jus Cogens, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1073, 1081 n.
21 (2011). See also Pablo Nájera (Fr. v. Mex.), 5 R.I.A.A. 466, 470, 472 (FrenchMexican Claims Comm’n 1928); Oscar Chinn (U.K. v. Belg.), Judgment, 1934
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 65, 149 (Dec. 12) (separate opinion by Schucking,
J.).
112. See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 111, at 1081; Jochen Frowein, Jus Cogens,
in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Rudiger
Wolfrum ed., 2012).
113. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 22 (Apr. 9).
114. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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Convention, “the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on
States, even without any conventional obligation.”115
The idea of jus cogens obligations took on further concreteness
through its inclusion under the heading of peremptory norms’
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.116 This inclusion was incorporated in large part thanks to support for the
idea from socialist and decolonizing states in the 1960s.117 The
idea also built on the work the widely respected Polish-British
jurist, Hersch Lauterpacht, and other early ILC rapporteurs had
done to formulate a rule stipulating that treaty obligations
would be rendered void where they conflicted with “overriding
principles of international law which may be regarded as constituting principles of international public policy (ordre international public).”118 In its 1970 decision in Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Company, Ltd., the ICJ endorsed a similar
115. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crimes of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15, ¶ 23 (May 28).
In his dissent, Judge Alvarez observed:
the new international law . . . includes within its domain . . .
conventions which seek to establish new and important principles of international law [and] conventions seeking to regulate matters of a social or humanitarian interest with a view
to improving the position of individuals. . . . The new international law, reflecting the new orientation of the legal conscience of the nations, condemns genocide as it condemns
war as a crime against civilization. . . .
Id. ¶ 51 (separate opinion of Alvarez, M.). A decade later, another dissent
would emphasize the idea of higher-order obligations as well, with Judge
Tanaka in the South West Africa Cases (Second Phase) observing that “the law
concerning the protection of human rights may be considered to belong to the
jus cogens.” South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second
Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, at 298 (July 18) (separate opinion of
Tanaka, K.).
116. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
117. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 200 (2005); Marina
Spinedi, International Crimes of State
The Legislative History, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC’S DRAFT
ARTICLE 19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 12 13 (Joseph Weiler, Antonio Cassese &
Marina Spinedi eds., 1989).
118. Hersch Lauterpacht, Report on the Law of Treaties of Special Rapporteur, 1953 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 155, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add.1,
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idea, while demonstrating a notable reluctance to employ the
term jus cogens, referring instead to “obligations erga omnes.”119
More recently, in its 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ returned to the
contemplation of higher-order norms, observing:
It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian
law applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person and “elementary considerations of
humanity” . . . that the Hague and Geneva Conventions have
enjoyed a broad accession. Further these fundamental rules
are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute
intransgressible principles of international customary law.120

As James Crawford, a respected Australian jurist and the Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility of the ILC from 1997 until 2001, has put it, while the ICJ referred to the fundamental
rules of international humanitarian law as intransgressible,’
“[s]ince such rules are regrettably often transgressed, it presumably meant peremptory without wishing to say so.”121
As attested above, by the end of the twentieth century, there
was solid legal support for the idea of jus cogens obligations. The
ILC’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Draft Articles”) built on that tradition
119. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v.
Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 32 ¶ 33 (Feb. 5). As one
commentator has observed, in doing so, the ICJ
added to the armoury of multilateralism but in a confusing
way, since all the examples it gave of “obligations . . . towards
the international community as a whole” could equally have
been taken as examples of peremptory norms and indeed
most of them had been listed by the ILC as potential examples in its commentary.
James Crawford, Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law,
319 RECUEIL DES COURS 325, 410 (2006), citing 1966 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 248,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1.
120. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 257, ¶ 79 (July 8). The ICJ also referred to the idea in the
interim in Nicaragua v. United States, albeit in the context of referring to the
briefs submitted to it. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 82, ¶ 190. See also Tladi, supra note 107, at
¶ 46.
121. Crawford, supra note 119, at 415.
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and went a step further by providing more details as to the responsibilities flowing from jus cogens obligations. In particular,
Articles 40 and 41 of the Draft Articles addressed “serious
breaches of peremptory norms of general international law.”122
122. Previously, the Draft Articles had referred to state criminality. This language, however, was dropped for a number of reasons. For more on the problems involved in the idea of state criminality and the decision to drop that terminology, see Crawford, supra note 119, at 460 71.
The precise coverage of the category of serious breaches’ remains open to
debate. The Articles on State Responsibility specifically recognize the category
as including the prohibitions on the following: (1) aggression; (2) self-determination; (3) genocide; (4) slavery and the slave trade; (5) apartheid; (6) racial
discrimination; (7) torture; and (8) the basic rules of international humanitarian law. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, supra note 2, at 112 13, art. 40, cmt. 4 5. For more sources
contemplating the coverage of jus cogens norms, see Barcelona Traction, Light
and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), supra note 119, ¶¶ 33 34; Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J Rep. 16 (June 21); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 82; Roach v. U.S.,
Case 9647, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 3/87, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71, doc. 9
rev. 1 (1986 1987); Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment,
1995 I.C.J. Rep. 77 (June 30); Victims of the Tugboat “13 de Marzo” v. Cuba,
Case 11.436, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 47/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc.
7 rev. (1996); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, supra note 58; Juridical Condition and
Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Report No. OC-18/03 (Sept. 17, 2003); Domingues v. United States, Case
12.285, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R, Report No. 62/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1
rev. 1. (2002); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 77; Armed Activities on the Territory of
the Congo (D.R.C. v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. Rep. 6 (Feb. 3); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43
(Feb. 26).
The 1987 Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States similarly listed under the heading customary international law of human rights’
genocide, slavery and the slave trade, torture and systemic racial discrimination, while also referencing murder or disappearance, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, and consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 702
(1987). The definition of gross rights violations in United States law, the terms
of which were mostly supplied in the mid-1970s, encompasses “torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without
charges and trial, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and
clandestine detention of those persons, and other flagrant denial of the right
to life, liberty, or the security of the person.” 22 U.S.C. § 2304(d)(1) (2014).
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Complicity, in a general sense, was already addressed by the
Draft Articles in Article 16.123 The key question relative to peremptory norms, therefore, was what additional obligations
might be understood to flow from their violation, above and beyond the obligation to avoid complicity in international law violations generally. The ILC answered this question by stipulating
that states must not “render aid or assistance in maintaining
[the] situation” in question, recognizing implicitly that serious
violations generally constitute states of affairs extended in
time.124 In addition, the ILC stipulated that all states must take
the proactive, future-oriented measure of “cooperat[ing] to bring
to an end through lawful means any serious breach.”125

While the Articles do not mention crimes against humanity as a specific
category under the heading of peremptory norms, the inclusion of such a category has been suggested in several important sources. See ILC, Fragmentation
of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.702, ¶ 33 (July 18, 2006); JAMES
CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 594 97 (8th
ed., 2012).
123. Article 16 states that:
A state which aids or assists another state in the commission
of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: [a] that state does so with
knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and [b] the act would be internationally wrongful if
committed by that state.
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
supra note 2, at 65, art. 16. There has been some discussion, as discussed
above, as to whether a knowledge standard, as stipulated by Article 16, or an
intent standard, as stipulated within some of the notes following Article 16, is
more appropriate. For more, see, e.g., Lowe, supra note 100; AUST, supra note
100; Goodman & Jackson, supra note 100. The weight of contemporary opinion,
however, is more behind a knowledge standard, which is also the position
adopted by a compelling 2016 study, which highlights that legal understandings of intent have often encompassed knowledge that certain consequences
will occur in the ordinary course of events. See Moynihan, supra note 100, ¶¶
65 70. It is also worth noting that Article 16 was recognized as reflecting customary international law in Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), supra note 122, ¶ 419.
124. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 2, at 113 14, art. 41(2).
125. Id. art. 41(1).
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The ICJ has continued to underscore the existence and significance of jus cogens norms since 2001, including in the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall case126 as well as in
126. The ICJ observed that:
[T]he obligations violated by Israel include certain obligations erga omnes. . . . The obligations erga omnes violated by
Israel are the obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and certain of its obligations
under international humanitarian law. . . . Given the character and the importance of the rights and obligations involved,
the Court is of the view that all States are under an obligation
not to recognise the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem. They are also under
an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining
the situation created by such construction. It is also for all
States, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to see to it that any impediment, resulting
from the construction of the wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is brought to
an end. In addition, all the States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War of 12 August 1949 are under an obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law,
to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law as
embodied in that Convention. . . . [T]he Court is of the view
that the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what further
action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated
regime. . . .
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, supra note 77, ¶¶ 155, 159 60. Crawford has observed,
Consistent with its earlier reticence about peremptory
norms, the Court appears to have treated the legal consequences of the breaches of the right to self-determination and
international humanitarian law as deriving from the erga
omnes character of the obligations breached. However, the
Opinion is not entirely clear in this respect. Although the
Court made no express reference to Articles 40 and 41 it did
use, unacknowledged, actual words drawn from Article 41.
Moreover the Court’s reference to the “character and importance of the rights and obligations involved” can be read
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Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda, otherwise known
as the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case, in
which the ICJ unequivocally affirmed the concept of jus cogens,
while recognizing genocide as amongst the clear examples of a
violation belonging in such a category.127
At the time of its inclusion in the Vienna Convention the idea
of jus cogens obligations was greeted with skepticism from some
quarters.128 Since then, however, “most of the initial skepticism
around the notion itself has tended to vanish,”129 since “[t]he concept of peremptory norms of general international law [has come
to be] recognized in international practice, in the jurisprudence
of international and national courts and tribunals and in legal
doctrine.”130 In 2015, the ILC appointed Dire Tladi as a Special
Rapporteur charged with considering the nature of jus cogens
norms. Tladi’s first report, issued in 2016, summarized the
strong support for the idea of jus cogens that had emerged over
the last several decades:
Since the adoption of the Vienna Convention . . . references to
jus cogens by States and in judicial decisions have increased
manifold. The explicit references to jus cogens in the judicial
practice of the International Court of Justice alone have been
telling. Since the adoption in 1969 of the Vienna Convention,
there have been 11 explicit references to jus cogens in majority
judgments or orders of the International Court of Justice, all of
which have assumed (or at least appear to assume) the existence of jus cogens as part of modern international law.131

as an elliptical reference to the peremptory character of the
norms in question rather than their erga omnes character.
Crawford, supra note 119, at 475.
127. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Rwanda), supra note 122, ¶ 64. The Separate Opinion of Judge Dugard affirms the importance of this statement. See id. (separate opinion of Dugard, J.).
128. See, e.g., Georg Schwartzenberger, International Jus Cogens?, 43 TEX.
L. REV. 455 (1965).
129. Fragmentation Report, supra note 107, ¶ 363.
130. ILC, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at
112 (2001). See also Ulf Linderfalk, The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever
Opened Pandora’s Box, Did You Ever Think About the Consequences?, 18 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 853, 855 (2008).
131. Tladi, supra note 107, at ¶ 46. The report continued by observing
In addition to express mentions in the majority decisions or
opinions of the International Court of Justice, there have
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The fact that jus cogens is now a well-recognized category of international law does not mean it will no longer be challenged.
Rather, as Christian Tomuschat, a respected German jurist and
former member of the ILC, has frankly observed, “powerful
states have never been friends of jus cogens. They realize that
the consequences of jus cogens may lead to a shift in the power
balance in favour of the international judiciary.”132 Growing
recognition of the category within international law, however,
suggests such a position is on the defensive.
The recognition of jus cogens norms is one matter, of course;
agreement about the necessary consequences of such recognition
is another. As one commentator has put it, there has been “a
tendency by some authors and, to a growing extent also by domestic courts, to deduce wide-ranging legal consequences out of
these rules and obligations.”133 Such a tendency has led to
pushback, including relative to the effects of jus cogens obligations on foreign sovereign immunity, for instance.134 The consequences suggested by the ILC’s Draft Articles, however, are well
been, in total, 78 express mentions of jus cogens in individual
opinions of the members of the Court. It has also been explicitly recognized in the jurisprudence of other international
courts and tribunals. . . . States too have routinely relied on
jus cogens or peremptory norms in a variety of forums. . . .
Id. ¶¶ 47 48. For a similar recognition of the growing attention being paid to
jus cogens norms, see Thomas Kleinlein, Jus Cogens Re-Examined: Value Formalism in International Law, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 295, 296 (2017).
132. Christian Tomuschat, The Security Council and Jus Cogens, in THE
PRESENT AND FUTURE OF JUS COGENS 20 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2015).
133. AUST, supra note 100, at 36. For one case relied upon by Aust, which
draw wide-ranging conclusions, see Multi-Member Court of Levadia, Case No.
137/1997, Judgment (Oct. 30, 1997).
134. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in Al-Adsani v. United
Kingdom against the proposition that, where credible jus cogens violations are
alleged, foreign sovereign immunity should not apply. Al-Adsani v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 273 (2001). That decision was
close, however, demonstrating the presence of sentiments on both sides of the
issue. For commentary on this issue, see Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction
over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators
of International Law Under the FISA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J.
INT’L L. 191 (1983); Lee Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741
(2003); Thomas Giegerich, Do Damage Claims Arising from Jus Cogens Violations Override State Immunity from the Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts?, in THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER JUS COGENS AND
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supported. Perhaps the most progressive suggestion made by the
ILC is that states have a positive obligation to bring serious
breaches to an end. The idea of such a positive obligation is not
to be found in the ILC’s Draft Articles alone, however, but rather
can also be seen in several other sources as well. As we have seen
above, Common Article 1 of the Geneva conventions has been
widely interpreted as requiring states to take positive steps to
ensure compliance with humanitarian law by all parties to conflict. The Genocide Convention too imposes a specific obligation
on states to bring genocides, wherever and by whatever party
committed, to an end.135 Human rights law generally, moreover,
requires not only that states respect, protect and fulfil the rights
of those subject to their jurisdiction, but also that they take steps
to ensure the success of the relevant rights regimes generally.136
Finally, in concluding that states have an obligation to bring serious breaches to an end, the ILC was also relying upon Security
Council sanctions practice.137 Since the time the ILC’s Draft Ar-

OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds.,
2006); Andrew Clapham, The Jus Cogens Prohibition of Torture and the Importance of Sovereign State Immunity, in PROMOTING JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW
LIBER AMICORUM
LUCIUS CAFLISCH (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 2007); all cited in AUST, supra note
100, at 37 39.
The ICJ ruled similarly on the sovereign immunity question. See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J Rep. 99, ¶¶
87, 92 97 (Feb. 3). The ICJ, however, took pains to distinguish its preservation
of the doctrine of state immunity in foreign courts from recognition that individual immunity might fold in cases of serious jus cogens violation. In this context, it is worth highlighting that the divergence in the rules somewhat mirrors
the move from general to targeted sanctions.
135. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 114, art. 1. See also Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb.
& Montenegro), supra note 122, ¶¶ 430 38.
136. For more on this point generally, see, e.g., Austria v. Italy, App. No.
788/60, 4 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 116 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1961); Ireland v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 239 (1978); Soering
v. United Kingdom, supra note 69, ¶ 87; Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to
Community Interest in International Law, 250 RECUEIL DES COURS 217 (1994);
The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the
Covenant, supra note 67.
137. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 2, at 113 14, art. 41, explanatory ¶ 12.

242

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:1

ticles were prepared, the support within Security Council practice for the ILC’s position has only continued to grow, as detailed
in the following section.
In sum, therefore, general international law contains a welldeveloped notion of jus cogens obligations. States must of course
not commit jus cogens violations. In addition, they must not provide aid and assistance to the commission and perpetuation of
such violations implying already an obligation to impose appropriate sanctions. Over and above such a negative obligation
not to be complicit, public international law suggests states have
a positive obligation as well to take whatever steps they can to
bring situations of jus cogens violation to an end. This positive
obligation suggests an even stronger and wider understanding
of the sorts of sanctions states are required to impose, in the context of the most serious violations.
E. Conclusion
The discussion above has considered the ways in which, within
various areas of international law human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law and general
international law the scope of international and transnational
responsibility has gradually extended over time.138 This gradual
development has been somewhat obscured by at least two factors. First, this development has been obscured by the fragmentation of the relevant obligations across four different substantive fields, each of which has its own community of experts and
distinct body of academic and practitioner work. When the evolutions of standards in all four of these bodies of law are considered side-by-side, however, the evidence that an obligation to impose sanctions in the context of the most serious forms of violation has been developing in public international law is hard to
ignore.
III. RIGHTS-BASED SANCTIONS IN PRACTICE
A growing sense that it may be necessary to impose sanctions,
of one sort or another, relative to the worst instances of harm is
attested to by the various international legal sources explored
above. Such a development may also be discerned by observing

138. For some further reflections on a similar theme, see Monica Hakimi,
State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341 (2010).
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unilateral and multilateral state practice, within which sanctions have increasingly been imposed on the basis of, and shaped
in accordance with, rights-based concerns. This section turns to
consider the recent evolution of such practice. Given the breadth
of relevant material, the following account cannot claim to be
exhaustive. A concerted effort has been made, however, to capture the majority of the most significant instances of rightsbased sanction.
The developments surveyed in the following sections are of
several different types. In particular, they encompass moments
in which: (1) sanctions were implemented in response to serious
rights violations; (2) rights were explicitly referenced as a justification for the implementation of sanctions; (3) law or policy of
a more general nature was passed, stipulating the necessity that
certain forms of sanction be imposed relative to certain sorts of
rights violation; and (4) rights violations were listed as a
grounds on the basis of which targeted sanctions should be imposed.
While all such developments reflect the growing interrelationship between sanctions and rights-based concerns, the precise
significance of each type of development is different. The imposition of sanctions in the face of serious rights violations, the
passage of laws requiring sanctions in cases of serious rights violations, and the tailoring of targeted sanctions to effect rights
violators all provide evidence of the manner in which the sense
of legal obligation to respond to rights violations with sanctions,
described in the last section, has gradually grown in practice as
well. In contrast, references to rights-based concerns as a justification for sanctions provide a weaker form of evidence for such
developments, because such references may be hypocritical or
merely intended as window-dressing. Even where hypocritically
invoked, however, the fact that rights are invoked as justification testifies to a sense on the part of the invokers that they may
obtain more legitimacy for their actions by invoking rights-based
rationales. It is apparent that in practice, therefore, rights-based
concerns are increasingly seen as appropriate grounds upon
which to impose and target sanctions.
A. United States Sanctions
There is a long history to the United States’ imposition of sanctions relative to rights violations, tracing back at least as far as
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the 1890 prohibition of the import of goods manufactured by convict laborers.139 The first major push to incorporate human
rights in a systemic way into U.S. foreign policy came in the
1970s.140 In the mid-1970s, the U.S. Congress passed several
laws aimed at limiting military support to governments engaged
in gross rights violations, including multiple amendments to the
Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act.141 The
1974 amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, which still
stand, stipulate that “no security assistance may be provided to
any country the government of which engages in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights,”142 though the U.S. executive branch has never complied
with this legal obligation.143 Several more targeted prohibitions
on military assistance were passed in the 1970s and 1980s as
well, targeting at various times countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
the Philippines, South Korea, Uganda, Uruguay and Zaire.144

139. See Sarah Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 31 (2001), citing 26 Stat. 624 (1890).
140. Key to the developments of the 1970s was the work of Donald Fraser, a
Democratic Congressman from Minnesota.
141. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87 195, 75 Stat. 424; Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, Title II of Pub. L. No. 94 329, 90 Stat. 729.
142. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (2014). The law provides for an exception when
the President certifies that extraordinary circumstances exist.
143. See Nina Serafino, June Beittel, Lauren Ploch Blanchard & Liana
Rosen, Leahy Law Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue
Overview,
CONG.
RES.
SERV.
3
(Jan.
29,
2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43361.pdf., which observes that Section 502B “has
been rarely if ever invoked” and that “[i]n response to CRS request, the State
Department did not report any instances in which Section 502B was invoked.
State Department officials stated that this provision has not been used because
it is overly broad.’” See also Daniel Mahanty, The Leahy Law Prohibiting US
Assistance to Human Rights Abusers: Pulling Back the Curtain, JUST SECURITY
(June 27, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/42578/leahy-law-prohibiting-assistance-human-rights-abusers-pulling-curtain/.
1976 Amendments to Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act introduced
the requirement that the State Department report human rights violations in
foreign countries, a requirement that was, in contrast, immediately implemented.
144. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93 559, § 25, 88
Stat. 1795, 1802; International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94 329, § 406, 90 Stat. 729, 758; Foreign Assistance
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94 441, § 505, 90
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Starting in 1986, and recurring regularly thereafter, the U.S.
Congress began inserting a clause into foreign assistance appropriation bills requiring that the government not provide funding
to governments established by military coup.145 Also in 1986, the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was adopted in the United
States, limiting investments in and trade with South Africa.146
In 1988 and 1989, the United States imposed a de facto arms
embargo on Myanmar, suspended financial assistance and revoked Myanmar’s preferred trading status, while the 1990 Customs and Trade Act required the U.S. President to impose sanctions on Myanmar if specific conditions, including progress on
human rights, were not met.147 In the 1990s, several countries’
Stat. 1465, 1473 (1976); Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95 148, § 503, 91 Stat. 1230, 1239 (1977); International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95 92, § 11, 91 Stat. 619, 620 (1977); Uganda Embargo Act, Section 5(b), 22
U.S.C. § 2151 (1978); International Security and Development Cooperation Act
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97 113, 95 Stat. 1519, 1556 (concerning El Salvador). For
more on the rights-based restrictions on U.S. government funding to foreign
states in the 1970s and the challenges these statutes faced in terms of implementation, see Stephen Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Assistance on Human Rights
Practices, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 246 (1982); Paul Albert, The Undermining of the
Legal Standards for Human Rights Violations in United States Foreign Policy:
The Case of Improvement’ in Guatemala, 14 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 231
(1983); Richard Nash, Certifying Human Rights: Military Assistance to El Salvador and the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981,
14 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275 (1983); Tanya Broder & Bernard Lambek,
Military Aid to Guatemala: The Failure of U.S. Human Rights Legislation, 13
YALE J. INT’L L. 111 (1988).
145. For more on this topic, see Notes, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance to Post-Coup States, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2499 (2014), observing, inter
alia, “increasingly, the U.S. government complies either fully or partially with
the coup provision’s requirements in situations that implicate the statute, but
does so only after asserting that it is not required to make a determination as
to whether the coup provision applies.” Id. at 2500.
146. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99 440, 100
Stat. 1086. The Act, passed despite an attempted veto by President Ronald
Reagan, imposed broad sanctions on South Africa, and specified a range of
measures South Africa would have to take to have those sanctions ended.
147. Customs and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101 382, § 139, 104 Stat. 629,
653. The law followed a 1988 decision by the United States to revoke Myanmar’s benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences. The law was later
followed up on by the mandatory prohibition of all aid except humanitarian
and anti-drug trafficking aid by Congress in 1996. Foreign Operations, Export
Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. 104 208,
§ 570, 110 Stat. 3009 121, 3009 166. The law also gave the U.S. President the

246

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:1

military aid was limited. For instance, in 1990 the United States
cut off a great deal of its aid to Guatemala, following the killing
of U.S. citizen, Michael DeVine, by members of the Guatemalan
military.148 In 1992, the United States terminated military aid
to Indonesia after the involvement of United States-trained security units in human rights violations in East Timor was revealed.149 In 1995, the United States barred military sales to Nigeria, following the execution of human rights defender and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa.150
The first incarnation of the Leahy laws,’ which prohibited military assistance to foreign forces involved in committing gross
rights violations, came in 1997. The 1997 version of the Leahy
laws was limited to the counter-narcotics context, but the laws
were expanded to have general applicability relative to foreign
aid the following year.151 As they evolved, the Leahy laws came
power to prohibit new investments in Myanmar if Myanmar acted against
Aung San Suu Kyi or committed large-scale repression. President Clinton invoked this authorization to prohibit new investments in 1997. See Exec. Order
No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (May 22, 1997).
The legislation was further followed up on by the 2003 Burmese Freedom
and Democracy Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108 61, §§ 1 9, 117 Stat. 864, which
inter alia banned the import of goods from Myanmar, required the U.S. Treasury to freeze the assets of individuals in the US holding senior positions within
the Myanmar government, and expanded a visa ban on those officials. The legislation stipulated it would remain in effect until the Myanmar government
has achieved “substantial and measurable progress to end violations of internationally recognized human rights including rape” and “no longer systematically violates workers’ rights, including the use of forced and child labor, and
conscription of child soldiers.” Id. at § 3(a)(3)(A) & (B), 866. In renewing the
legislation in 2006, the United States administration observed that among
their purposes was “denying [Burmese] rulers the hard currency they use to
fund their repression, [thereby] providing strong incentives for democratic
change and human rights.” Press Release, White House, Statement on Burmese Democracy Act (July 28, 2003). For more, see Ewing-Chow, supra note
19.
148. See Intelligence Oversight Board, Report on the Guatemala Review,
CLINTON PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. (June 28, 1996), https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36167.
149. See Larry Niksch, Indonesia: U.S. Relations with the Indonesian Military, CONG. RES. SERV. (Aug. 10, 1998), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19980810_98677_ccc717c388e29caae32d5e71103fe52381077691.pdf.
150. See Nigeria: The Role of the International Community, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(1997),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/nigeria/Nigeria10.htm#P657_174476.
151. See Serafino et al., supra note 143.
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to apply in slightly different form to Department of State and
Department of Defense-provided foreign assistance.152 The essential aim and content, however, is the same in both contexts,
prohibiting assistance to military units involved in committing
gross rights violations.153
More recent United States sanctions have relied explicitly on
human rights’ as grounds for their imposition. While sanctions
imposed by the United States against Zimbabwe in 2003 did not
refer to human rights explicitly, they came close to doing so.154
Three years later, in 2006, the justification of sanctions against
Belarus included explicit reference to human rights. Specifically,
the introduction to Executive Order 13,405 observed that:
[A]ctions and policies of certain members of the Government of
Belarus and other persons to undermine Belarus’ democratic
processes or institutions, manifested most recently in the fun-

152. The component of the Leahy laws addressing the State Department has
been incorporated into the Foreign Assistance Act; inter alia, it requires that
“[n]o assistance shall be furnished . . . to any unit of the security forces of a
foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit
has committed a gross violation of human rights.” 22 U.S.C. § 3728d(a) (2017).
The Department of Defense portion of the Leahy laws meanwhile stipulates
that “[o]f the amounts made available to the Department of Defense, none may
be used for any training, equipment, or other assistance for a unit of a foreign
security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information that the unit
has committed a gross violation of human rights.” 10 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2017).
The State Department’s definition of gross violations includes: extrajudicial
killings; enforced disappearances; rape and torture as constituting gross violations; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges and trial; and other fragrant denials of the right to
life, liberty, or the security of person. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(d) (2014).
153. See Serafino et al., supra note 143.
154. Specifically, Executive Order 13288 observed that the sanctions it imposed were motivated by:
the actions and policies of certain members of the Government of Zimbabwe and other persons to undermine Zimbabwe’s democratic processes or institutions, contributing to
the deliberate breakdown in the rule of law in Zimbabwe, to
politically motivated violence and intimidation in that country, and to political and economic instability in the southern
African region, constitute an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the foreign policy of the United States. . . .
Exec. Order No. 13,288, 68 Fed. Reg. 11,457 (Mar. 6, 2003).

248

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:1

damentally undemocratic March 2006 elections, to commit human rights abuses related to political repression, including detentions and disappearances, and to engage in public corruption . . . constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security and foreign policy of the United States. . . . 155

United States-imposed sanctions in subsequent years continued
to include such explicit references.156
Starting in 2010, United States sanctions took another step
towards greater attention to rights-based concerns, by specifying
rights violations as a basis for targeting. Executive Order
13,553, titled “Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to Serious Human Rights Abuses by the Government of
Iran and Taking Certain Other Actions,” included a list of persons against whom targeted sanctions were to be applied, while
also allowing for future inclusions on the list of persons affiliated
with the Iranian government determined to be “responsible for
or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights
abuses.”157 Targeted sanctions imposed in subsequent years
155. Exec. Order No. 13,405, 71 Fed. Reg. 35,485 (June 20, 2006).
156. See Exec. Order No. 13,412, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,369 (Oct. 17, 2006) (concerning Sudan); Exec. Order No. 13,448, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,223 (Oct. 23, 2007) (concerning Burma); Exec. Order No. 13,469, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,841 (July 29, 2008)
(concerning Zimbabwe). Traditionally, such sanctions always included a reference to the existence of an extraordinary threat’, in order to invoke the powers
conveyed to the President under the International Emergency Powers Act and
the National Emergencies Act. With an Executive Order issued in late 2017,
this language was somewhat amended (thanks to the passage of the Global
Magnitsky Act). The preamble to Executive Order 12818 observed that
the prevalence and severity of human rights abuse and corruption . . . have reached such scope and gravity that they
threaten the stability of international political and economic
systems. . . . [S]erious human rights abuse and corruption
around the world constitute an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of
the United States. . . .
Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or
Corruption, Exec. Order No. 13,818, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,839 (Dec. 20, 2017). For
more, see Rob Berschinski, Trump Administration Notches a Serious Human
Rights Win. No, Really., JUST SECURITY (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/50846/trump-administration-notches-human-rights-win-no-really/.
157. Exec. Order No. 13,553, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,567 (Oct. 1, 2010) (concerning
Iran).
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have continued to follow this model.158 In other words, human
rights concerns have provided not only a reason for the application of sanctions, but also a criterion on the basis of which targeted sanctions are applied.
The growing attention to rights-based concerns on the part of
sanctions implemented through executive orders would come to
be reflected in legislation as well. In 2008, the United States
Congress passed the Child Soldier Prevention Act, prohibiting
military assistance to the governments of countries employing
child soldiers.159 In 2012, Congress passed the Sergei Magnitsky
Rule of Law Accountability Act, sanctioning various Russian officials, following their involvement in the death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky.160 Congress followed up on the Sergei
Magnitsky Act with the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act in December 2016.161 In essence, the Global
Magnitsky Act authorized the President to impose sanctions on
foreign persons inter alia on the basis of their having committed
gross human rights violations, subject to certain restrictions.162
B. European Union Sanctions
Even before the European Union began to develop a sanctions
policy, European states often imposed sanctions on the basis of
rights-based concerns. Events in Chile in the early 1970s were
particularly important in this context. On September 11, 1973,

158. See Exec. Order No. 13,566, 76 Fed. Reg. 11,315 (Apr. 21, 2011) (concerning Libya); Exec. Order No. 13,572, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,787 (May 3, 2011) (concerning Syria); Exec. Order No. 13,606, 77 Fed. Reg. 24,571 (Apr. 24, 2012)
(concerning Syria and Iran); Exec. Order No. 13,619, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,243 (July
13, 2012) (concerning Burma); Exec. Order No. 13,664, 79 Fed. Reg. 19,283
(Apr. 7, 2014) (concerning South Sudan); Exec. Order No. 13,667, 79 Fed. Reg.
28,387 (May 15, 2014) (concerning the Central African Republic); and Exec.
Order No. 13,692, 80 Fed. Reg. 12,747 (Mar. 11, 2015) (concerning Venezuela).
159. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110 457, 122 Stat. 5044.
160. Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 112 208,
126 Stat. 1496 (Dec. 14, 2012).
161. Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 114
328, 130 Stat. 2000, 2534 (2016).
162. The language of the statute poses certain complications relative to this
overly simple read; for an excellent overview of some of those issues, which also
highlights how the practice has been more expansive than the language might
have suggested, see Berschinski, supra note 156.
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a military coup led by Augusto Pinochet overthrew the government of democratically-elected socialist president Salvador Allende in Chile. In response, several European states imposed
sanctions, including an arms ban imposed by the United Kingdom and the halting of financial support by the United Kingdom,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway.163 In 1982, the
Netherlands suspended aid to Suriname, the former Dutch colony on the northeastern coast of South America, following serious human rights violations committed by the military government there.164
More recently, the European Union has begun to advance a
common sanctions policy. In numerous instances, such sanctions
have been imposed on the basis of rights violations. Following
the military coup in Sudan that brought Omar al-Bashir to
power in 1989, the European Union suspended aid to Sudan in
1990, and imposed an arms embargo in 1994.165 The European
Union similarly suspended aid and imposed an arms embargo
on Myanmar in 1990, a position confirmed by the adoption of a
common European Union position166 in 1996, which highlighted
“the absence of [democratization] and . . . the continuing violation of human rights” as grounds for the sanctions measures in
question.167 The European Union suspended aid to Zaire in 1992,
and imposed an arms embargo and travel bans in 1993, following Mobuto’s dissolution of the government of Prime Minister
Tshisekedi and ensuing violence.168 Following a 1993 coup in Nigeria, the European Union suspended military cooperation and
imposed a partial arms embargo and travel restrictions, which

163. See AUST, supra note 100, at 145 46.
164. See id. at 132. For more on the context of rights violations in Suriname
at the time, see Marc Bossuyt & John Griffiths, Human Rights in Suriname,
INT’L COMM’N JURISTS (1983).
165. See Council Decision 94/165/CFSP, 1994 O.J. (L 75) 1.
166. A common position’ is a mutually-agreed and binding foreign policy position of European Union states.
167. Council Common Position No. 1996/635/CFSP of 28 October 1996, 1996
O.J. (L 287) 1. The 1996 Common Position added a visa ban to the arms and
aid embargoes. This would be complemented by the revocation of Burma’s benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences in 1997 and a freeze on assets in 2000. For more, see Ewing-Chow, supra note 19. See also Council Decision 2010/232/CFSP, 2010 O.J. (L 105) 22.
168. See Council Common Position No. 2002/829/CFSP of 21 October 2002,
2002 O.J. (L 285) ¶ 1.
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were escalated in 1995 following the Nigerian government’s execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, a human rights defender and activist.169 The European Union imposed an arms embargo on the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1996, followed by further targeted sanctions in 1998, which it justified in part on the basis
that Yugoslavia’s attacks constituted “an unacceptable violation
of human rights”.170
More recently, European Union sanctions have begun to be
more specifically targeted on the basis of rights violations as
well. In 2002, the European Union imposed targeted sanctions
referred to as restrictive measures’ in the European Union context on Zimbabwe. In general, the European Union justified
these measures on the grounds of Zimbabwe’s imposition of limitations on democracy and violations of human rights.171 The
sanctions specifically targeted “persons . . . [engaged in] activities [that] seriously undermine democracy, respect for human
rights and the rule of law.”172 The European Union also imposed
sanctions on Belarus in 2002, following Belarus’s hostile response to an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe report criticizing the lack of democracy in the country.173
While the European Union suspended those sanctions following
a reversal of position by the Belarusian government, it imposed
new sanctions in 2004, justified on the grounds of concerns with
the poor state of democracy and a lack of respect for the rule of
law and human rights in Belarus.174 The European Union justified sanctions it imposed on Uzbekistan in 2005 on similar
grounds.175
169. See Council Common Position No. 95/515/CFSP of 20 November 1995,
1995 O.J. (L 298) 1.
170. See Council Common Position No. 96/184/CFSP of 7 March 1996, 1996
O.J. (L 58) 1; Council Common Position No. 1998/240/CFSP of 19 March 1998,
1998 O.J. (L 095) 1.
171. See Council Common Position No. 2002/145/CFSP of 18 February 2002,
2002 O.J. (L 50) 1; see also Council Regulation 314/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 55) 1;
Council Decision 2011/101/CFSP, 2011 O.J. (L. 42) 6.
172. Council Decision 2011/101/CFSP, supra note 171, at 7, art. 4(1).
173. See Mikael Eriksson, EU Sanctions: Three Cases of Targeted Sanctions,
in INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: BETWEEN WORDS AND WARS IN THE GLOBAL
SYSTEM (Peter Wallersteen & Carina Staibano eds., 2005).
174. See Council Common Position No. 2004/661/CFSP of 24 September 2004,
2004 O.J. (L 301) 67. See also Council Regulation 765/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 134)
1; Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP, 2012 O.J. (L 285) 1.
175. See Council Common Position No. 2005/792/CFSP of 14 November 2005,
2005 O.J. (L 299) 72.
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The European Union’s sanctions policy took a significant step
towards greater consistency through the agreement of basic
principles governing the use and deployment of sanctions in
2004.176 The principles highlight that sanctions will be used “to
maintain and restore international peace and security” and that
the European Union will work to ensure that United Nations
sanctions are made effective.177 The principles also allow for autonomous European Union use of sanctions, “in support of efforts
to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and as a restrictive measure to uphold respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance,”
while requiring that sanctions be carried out with “full respect
of human rights and the rule of law.”178
The Lisbon Treaty, a major agreement on reform of the European Union aimed primarily at the generation of a consistent
and coherent foreign policy on the part of the union, entered into
force on December 1, 2009.179 Amongst other things, the Lisbon
Treaty laid out a new common foreign and security policy framework for the European Union. In particular, Article 21 of the
Lisbon Treaty adopted an explicitly norm-based approach to foreign policy, requiring that the shared foreign policy of the Union
be formed on the basis of the principles of “democracy, the rule
of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles
of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the
United Nations Charter and international law.”180

176. Council of the European Union, Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive
Measures (Sanctions), 10198/1/04 Rev. 1 (June 7, 2004).
177. Id. ¶ 1.
178. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7. In 2005, the Basic Principles were complemented by the
“Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures” and
“Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures.” Both
texts have been updated several times since. See Council of the European Union, Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures
(Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy,
11205/12 (June 15, 2012); Council of the European Union, Restrictive Measures
(Sanctions) Update of the EU Best Practices for the Effective Implementation
of Restrictive Measures, 15530/16 (Dec. 14, 2016).
179. For more, see Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007
O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
180. Id. art 21(1).
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In 2012, the European Parliament called on the European
Council to adopt a more consistent policy on sanctions.181 The
European Parliament urged that sanctions be brought more
fully within a rule of law framework, highlighted the connection
between sanctions and international criminal law, stressed the
need to be sensitive to unintended consequences, and emphasized the importance of ensuring that sanctions target breakdowns of democracy and rights-based concerns.182
Recent European Union restrictive measures have continued
both to justify themselves in relation to rights violations and to
target rights violators. For example, following the introduction
of Security Council sanctions, the European Union imposed restrictive measures on Libya in 2011.183 Like United Nations
sanctions, the European Union’s sanctions targeted individuals
181. See Consistent Policy Towards Regimes Against Which the European
Union Applies Restrictive Measures, EUR. PARL. DOC. 2011/2187(INI) (2012).
182. In particular, the European Parliament urged the following from the
Council:
(a) to develop clear criteria for when restrictive measures are
to be applied . . . ; (c) to inscribe the sanctions in a comprehensive policy context, establishing short-term and long-term
objectives for a sustainable democratization process . . . ; (e)
to systematically support the work of the International Criminal Court by ensuring that the procedures and the judgments of the court are duly regarded in EU sanctions policy;
(f) to urge EU Member States to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction in tackling impunity and crimes against
humanity . . . ; (p) to ensure that, in countries on which restrictive measures are imposed, the main actors championing
democracy and human rights are closely involved in the process of designing, implementing and evaluating restrictive
measures; [and] (q) to commit the existing structures within
the EEAS and Commission to conduct an in-depth situation
analysis of the economic and societal structure of the country
in question, prior to and after the adoption of sanctions, thus
examining the direct and indirect effects of all specific
measures on the political and socioeconomic realms of the society in question, as well as taking into account their impact
on business elites, civil society groups, the political opposition
and even reform-oriented elements within the government.
Id.
183. See Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP, arts. 5 6, 2011 O.J. (L 58) 53, 54
55.
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accused of human rights abuses.184 The same was the case in the
2014 restrictive measures on the Central African Republic185
and Yemen186 and the 2015 sanctions on South Sudan.187 The
European Union’s restrictive measures on Egypt and Tunisia in
2011 were justified in rights terms, while specifically targeting
corrupt government officials and those standing in the way of
democratic development.188 The measures the European Union
took concerning Syria specifically referred to “the violent repression, including through the use of live ammunition, of peaceful
protest in various locations across Syria, resulting in the death
of several demonstrators, wounded persons and arbitrary detentions.”189 The European Union’s restrictive measures on Burundi, imposed in 2015, were similarly themselves in terms of
rights violations, and specifically directed against individuals
“involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that violate
international human rights law or international humanitarian
law, as applicable, or that constitute serious human rights
abuses.”190
C. United Nations Sanctions
Finally, and most importantly from the point of view of global
legal standards, United Nations sanctions, too, have been increasingly shaped by rights-based concerns over time. Between
the 1960s and the 1980s, the United Nations imposed sanctions
against the settler minority government in Southern Rhodesia
and against the apartheid government in South Africa.191 The
Security Council recommended sanctions against Portugal as
well, following its refusal to relinquish its colonies in Africa.192

184. See id.
185. See Council Regulation 224/2014, art. 5, 2014 O.J. (L 70) 1, 3.
186. See Council Decision 2014/932/CFSP, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 365) 147;
Council Regulation 1352/2014, art. 3, 2014 O.J. (L 365) 60, 62.
187. See Council Decision 2015/740, arts. 3 6, 2015 O.J. (L 117) 52, 53 54;
Council Regulation 2015/735, ¶ 1, 2015 O.J. (L 1) 1, 2.
188. See Council Decision 2011/172/CFSP, ¶ 2, 2011 O.J. (L 76) 63; Council
Decision 2011/72/CFSP, ¶ 2, 2011 O.J. (L 28) 62.
189. See Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP, ¶ 2, 2011 O.J. (L 121) 11.
190. See Council Decision 2015/1763/CFSP, art. 1(1)(b), 2015 O.J. (L 257) 37,
38.
191. See S.C. Res. 217 (Nov. 20, 1965); S.C. Res. 232, supra note 11; S.C. Res.
277 (Mar. 18, 1970); S.C. Res. 418, supra note 11; S.C. Res. 569 (July 26, 1985).
192. See S.C. Res. 218 (Nov. 23, 1965).
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In every case, the sanctions were motivated by rights-based concerns.193 In short, while sanctions practice was sparse in the
Cold War years, when sanctions were applied, it was in the context of rights, self-determination and democratic governance.194
As observed above, the Security Council was reinvigorated after the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, the Security
Council imposed arms embargoes on both Somalia and Liberia.195 Both sanctions regimes were justified on the basis of the
human suffering in the countries in question, though neither explicitly invoked rights violations.196
The sanctions imposed on Haiti and Rwanda were a little more
explicit in terms of their grounding on rights-based concerns.
Following President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s removal from
power, the Organization of American States called for a trade

193. Sanctions were imposed and called for on bases such as: “usurpation of
power by a racist settler minority” (S.C. Res. 217, supra note 191, ¶ 3); “the
continued refusal of Portugal to” decolonize, and its “intensifying its measures
of repression and military operations against the African population with a
view to defeating their legitimate hopes of achieving self-determination” (S.C.
Res. 218, supra note 192); the “resort[ing] to massive violence against and killings of the African people, including schoolchildren and students and others
opposing racial discrimination, . . . violence against the African people . . . [and]
apartheid and racial discrimination” (S.C. Res. 418, supra note 11); and “the
continuance of the human suffering that the apartheid system . . . is causing.”
S.C. Res. 569, supra note 191. The sanctions imposed included calls for: “the
people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future” (S.C. Res. 217,
supra note 191); “the immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the
Territories under its administration to self-determination,” “the immediate
cessation of all acts of repression” and “the establishment of conditions that
will allow the free functioning of political parties” (S.C. Res. 218, supra note
192, ¶ 5(a) (c)); and “the total elimination of apartheid and the establishment
in South Africa of a free, united and democratic society on the basis of universal
suffrage.” S.C. Res. 569, supra note 191, ¶ 5.
194. Following the 1973 overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile, moreover,
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights commissioned a report on
the situation. The report, conducted by Antonio Cassese, found that support to
Chile helped to maintain a situation of serious rights violations implying the
appropriateness of sanctions, in the form of a limitation of such support, in
such a context. Antonio Cassese (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile), Study of the Impact of Foreign Economic Aid and Assistance on Respect for Human Rights in Chile, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/412 (Vols.
I to IV) (1978).
195. S.C. Res. 733 (Jan. 23, 1992); S.C. Res. 788, supra note 23.
196. See id.
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embargo on Haiti and the freezing of Haitian government assets.197 In 1993, the Security Council called for sanctions as
well.198 When renewing the sanctions on Haiti in 1994, the Council was clear that its aim was “the restoration of democracy,”
while highlighting concern with “the numerous instances of extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, abductions, rape and enforced disappearances, the continued denial of
freedom of expression, and the impunity with which armed civilians have been able to operate.”199 In its imposition of sanctions
on Rwanda in 1994, the Security Council highlighted “the ongoing violence and particularly . . . the very numerous killings of
civilians” and “systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of
international humanitarian law . . . as well as other violations of
the rights to life and property.”200
The International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations agency responsible for setting labor standards and promoting social protections, contributed to the ongoing development of
violation-based sanctioning as well. In 1999, the ILO effectively
expelled Myanmar, prohibiting it from participation in ILO activities and from receiving ILO technical assistance.201 In 2000,
the ILO Conference, for the first time in its history, invoked Article 33 of the ILO Charter in order to recommend that ILO
members review their relations with Myanmar, and that they
take measures in order to bring Myanmar into compliance with
its obligation to fight against the widespread and systematic use
of forced labor in the country.202
More recently, United Nations sanctions regimes have incorporated reference to rights violations far more extensively and
explicitly, including as a basis upon which to target sanctions.203
197. See OAS Res. 1/91, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/V.1, MRE/RES.1/91 (Oct. 2,
1991); OAS Res. 2/91, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/V.1, MRE/RES.2/91 (Oct. 8, 1991).
198. See S.C. Res. 841, supra note 17, strengthened by S.C. Res. 917 (May 6,
1994).
199. S.C. Res. 917, supra note 198.
200. S.C. Res. 918, supra note 23.
201. See Int’l Labour Org. Res. 1999/87 (June 1999). This followed up on the
appointment of a commission of inquiry by the ILO in 1997, the 1998 report of
which documented extensive rights violation in Myanmar.
202. Press Release, Int’l Labour Org., International Labour Conference
Adopts Resolution Targeting Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma), ILO Press
Release ILO/00/27 (June 14, 2000).
203. In this context, the idea of the Responsibility to Protect, which developed
in the early 2000s, is also worth a mention. The idea of the Responsibility to
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Sanctions imposed on Côte d’Ivoire in 2004 targeted those “responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.”204 The next year, the United Nations
imposed sanctions on Sudan, targeting inter alia “[t]hose who
impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities. . . .”205 Later, the
2006 sanctions on the Democratic Republic of Congo specifically
targeted “political and military leaders recruiting or using children in armed conflict in violation of international law,” as well
as “individuals committing serious violations of international
Protect grew out of the work of the International Commission for Intervention
and State Sovereignty, established by the Canadian government in response
to the United Nations Secretary-General’s foregrounding of the problem of humanitarian intervention in the wake of events in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo (see U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work
of the Organization, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. A/55/1 (Aug. 30, 2000)). The initial idea,
advanced in the 2001 report of the International Commission, was assertive,
suggesting a duty of intervention even outside of the Security Council framework (see INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Int’l Dev. Research Ctr., 2001)). The idea of
the Responsibility to Protect was endorsed by the High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change set up by the Secretary-General in 2004, which emphasized that the responsibility to protect attached to the Security Council in
particular (see Anand Panyarachun (Chairman of the High-Level Panel of
Threats, Challenges and Change), Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, ¶ 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). This approach was then further endorsed by the Secretary-General and the General
Assembly in 2005, and by the Security Council in 2006. See U.N. SecretaryGeneral, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005); G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶
138 39 (Oct. 24, 2005); S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4 (Apr. 28, 2006). In the process, however, the idea was watered down, with the sense of obligation, in particular,
being removed. For more, see, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect:
Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99 (2007); Jose
Alvarez, The Schizophrenias of R2P, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION, AND THE
USE OF FORCE (Philip Alston & Euan Macdonald eds., 2008).
Ultimately, while the process did not mark a major shift in itself, it provided
one further piece of evidence testifying to the gradually growing emphasis on
rights, human suffering and serious violations within the international community in general and the work of the Security Council in particular. The failure of the Responsibility to Protect idea to gain more traction was largely due
to the extent to which it came to be closely associated with the use of transnational force, and the 2003 intervention in Iraq in particular.
204. S.C. Res. 1572, ¶ 9 (Nov. 15, 2004).
205. S.C. Res. 1591, ¶ 3(c) (Mar. 29, 2005).
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law involving the targeting of children in situations of armed
conflict, including killing and maiming, sexual violence, abduction and forced disappearance.”206 In strengthening the sanctions on the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008, violations
against women were also recognized as grounds for targeting.207
Since 2011, responsibility for committing violations of human
rights and humanitarian law has been relied upon as a grounds
for targeting in sanctions imposed on Libya, Somalia, Eritrea,
Yemen, South Sudan and the Central African Republic.208 In
short, rights-based concerns have come to increasingly shape the
imposition and targeting of United Nations sanctions regimes, a
development that is likely to continue in future.209

206. S.C. Res. 1698, ¶ 13 (July 31, 2006).
207. S.C. Res. 1807, ¶ 13(e) (Mar. 31, 2008).
208. See S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 22(a) (Feb. 26, 2011); S.C. Res. 2002, ¶ 1(e) (July
29, 2011); S.C. Res. 2174, ¶ 4(a) (Aug. 27, 2014); S.C. Res. 2140, ¶ 18(c) (Feb.
26, 2014); S.C. Res. 2206, ¶ 7(c) (d) (Mar. 3, 2015); S.C. Res. 2262, ¶ 13(b) (c)
(Jan. 27, 2016). The use of children in armed conflict has been emphasized as
a key form of violation relative to the process of selecting targets in particular.
The deployment of sanctions based on violations of children’s rights developed
out of an extended history of advocacy. Particular milestones included: the report of the Special Rapporteur’s expert on Children in Armed Conflict in 1996;
a Security Council statement on children in armed conflict in 1998; and a thematic resolution by the Security Council in 1999 requesting what would be the
first in an ongoing series of annual reports by the Secretary-General on the
theme. See Graca Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, ¶ 135, U.N.
Doc A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1998); U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3896th mtg. at 5, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.3896 (June 29, 1998); S.C. Res. 1261, ¶¶ 15 16 (Aug. 30, 1999). In
2001, the Security Council went a step further, requesting the Secretary-General to attach an annex to his reports, listing all those parties employing children in armed conflict. See S.C. Res. 1379, ¶ 16 (Nov. 21, 2001). In 2004 the
Security Council for the first time floated the possibility of applying sanctions
to those responsible for the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict,
a resolution expanded to focus on a broader range of violations the following
year. See S.C. Res. 1539, ¶ 5(c) (Apr. 22, 2004); S.C. Res. 1612, ¶ 9 (July 26,
2005)). The targeting of those violating the rights of children was put in place
for the first time in the sanctions imposed on the Democratic Republic of Congo
in 2006, as detailed above. For more, see David Koller & Miriam EckenfelsGarcia, Using Targeted Sanctions to End Violations Against Children in Armed
Conflict, 33 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 11 (2015).
209. As one observer has put it, “One notable trend recently has been the
increasing use of designation criteria related to human rights and the protection of civilians in armed conflict, including women and children.” UN Sanctions, supra note 29.
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D. Conclusion
While the previous section contemplated the relationship between sanctions and rights-based concerns as a matter of legality, this section has considered that relationship as a matter of
practice. This investigation has revealed that there is a longstanding, close relationship between sanctions and rights-based
concerns. Early United Nations sanctions on Rhodesia and
South Africa had a clear link to rights-based concerns, though of
course they were more overtly framed in relationship to the
struggles for decolonization and national sovereignty. The overthrow of the Pinochet regime in Chile also had an important effect on the development of rights-based sanctions.210 It has been
since the end of the Cold War, however, that the relationship
between rights-based concerns and sanctions has most extensively developed, as rights violations have come to be relied upon
both as a justification for the imposition of sanctions and as a
basis upon which to target them.
The fact that there has been an increasingly close relationship
between sanctions and rights-based concerns does not mean that
all sanctions measures that have been imposed have been motivated by and designed with sensitivity to such concerns. Sanctions are imposed on a wide variety of bases and are fundamentally shaped by political as well as normative concerns. What the
above investigation testifies to, however, is that in contradiction
to what single-minded exponents of realpolitik visions of international affairs would suggest, rights-based concerns have come
to play an increasingly significant role in practice shaping both
when sanctions are deployed in general, and against which individuals and entities in particular. Considered side-by-side with
the development in the law explored above, the evolution of practice examined here provides further evidence of a growing sense
that sanctions are obligatory relative to the most severe instances of rights violation.

210. On the importance of the response to the 1973 coup in Chile to the history of human rights, see Jan Eckel, Under a Magnifying Glass : The International Human Rights Campaign Against Chile in the Seventies, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann ed., 2011); Patrick William Kelly, The Chilean Coup and the Origins of Transnational Human
Rights Activism, 8 J. GLOBAL HIST. 178 (2013).
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IV. FROM DISCRETION TO LAW
The previous sections have detailed the manner in which sanctions, a quintessential component of international power politics, have become increasingly bound by rights-based concerns
on all sides, over the course of the last three decades in particular. In order to map out that development, it was necessary to
pay close attention to numerous details, in order to trace the often gradual, step-by-step manner in which such evolution has
occurred. Having produced such a fine-grained account, it is possible to take a step back, and to consider the bigger-picture significance of the development that has occurred.
Most fundamentally, this development impacts on the manner
and extent to which the international legal order may be understood as bounded by law. The extent to which the international
order should be understood as so bounded as opposed to understood as a space fundamentally characterized by discretion is
a matter of long-standing dispute. On the one hand, the ICJ famously suggested in S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey) that states
are free to do whatever has not been explicitly prohibited. 211
Since that 1927 decision, however, the nature of the international legal system has evolved, as both the scope and the content of international law have gradually extended.212
211. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 10 (Sept.
7). The decision was perhaps never meant to be read as broadly as it in fact
was. For more, see Max Huber, Observations, 31 ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DE
DROIT INT’L 79 (1936).
212. On the gradual evolution of the scope and content of international law,
and its relationship to understandings of the fundamental nature of the international legal order, see HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 120, at 270 71, ¶¶ 13 15; Ole Spiermann, Lotus and the Double Structure of International Legal Argument, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999).
While this article considers certain themes in public international law, the evolution of international trade law also has implications relative to sanctions. In
particular, the international trade regime may be understood to have robbed
states of the discretion to impose sanctions without just cause, as should they
do so. Those sanctions would constitute violations of various obligations imposed by the international trade law regime. Rights-based rationales, of course,
should be understood as providing just grounds for abrogating trade law obligations. On such a point, see Robert Howse & Jared Genser, Are EU Trade
Sanctions on Burma Compatible with WTO Law?, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 165
(2008).
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The creation of the Security Council at the end of World War
II constituted amongst the most momentous changes to the international legal order ever undertaken. On the one hand, the
creation of the Council could be taken as increasing the order in
the system, insofar as the Council was set up with an authority
exceeding that of any individual state. On the other hand, within
the Council discretionary power of decision was preserved or
at least, so it seemed at first.
The tensions between discretion and a regularized, universalized, legal’ frame, that have played out in the context of debates
concerning Security Council power, may be seen as clearly in the
context of sanctions as anywhere else. Significantly, what have
come to be known as sanctions’ were not referred to as such in
the United Nations Charter. Instead, the Charter used vaguer
and more general terms, with Article 39 stipulating that the Security Council has discretionary power to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression” and to “decide what measures shall be taken” in response, though Article 41 highlighted the “complete or partial
interruption of economic relations” as a particular example of
such a measure.213 As the prominent Austrian jurist and theorist
Hans Kelsen observed at the time, the purpose of Security Council enforcement action was “not to maintain or restore the law,
but to maintain, or restore peace, which is not necessarily identical with the law.”214 As another distinguished jurist, Vera
Gowlland-Debbas, has put it more recently,
The mandatory decisions of the Security Council under Chapter VII, which are triggered by a determination under Article
39 that there is either a threat to or a breach of the peace, or
an act of aggression, are the outcome of political considerations, not legal reasoning, and nor are its proceedings judicial
procedures.215

In short, the Security Council’s decisions are fundamentally political acts, not attempts to interpret and apply the rules of international law.
213. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41.
214. HANS KELSEN, LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 294 (1951). See also Hans
Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense under the Charter of the
United Nations, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 783, 788 (1948).
215. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Functions of the United Nations Security
Council in the International Legal System, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 287 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
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To cease the consideration of the matter at this point would,
however, be to cease contemplation too soon. As Gowlland-Debbas has observed, Kelsen himself also advanced what might be
taken as a rival hypothesis, stipulating that Security Council action might be understood as only permitted in case of violation
of the law.216 Contemplating the matter more generally, two
sources of limitations on Security Council action are immediately apparent. First, it is hard to contest that the Security
Council’s power must be understood as limited by the provisions
of the United Nations Charter. Such a limitation flows from the
manner in which Chapter VII delimits the parameters under
which the Council may take action. It also stems from the references to human rights in the Preamble and Article 1(3), which
should also be understood as shaping and limiting Council
power.217 In addition, insofar as jus cogens obligations generally
apply higher-order binding obligations upon states, they are presumably binding relative to the Security Council as well.218
216. See KELSEN, supra note 214, at 735 37, quoted in Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 215, at 286 n.33.
217. On the manner in which the human rights obligations in the United Nations Charter should be understood as limiting the discretion of the Security
Council, see, among innumerable sources, Conditions of Admission of a State
to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. Rep. 57
(May 28); THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (ReneJean Dupuy ed., 1992); MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND THE
SECURITY COUNCIL: TESTING THE LEGALITY OF ITS ACTS (1994); Derek Bowett,
The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settlement Procedures, 5
EUR. J. INT’L L. 89, 92 93 (1994); THOMAS FRANK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 215, at 304 06;
ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 230
(2007); Marko Milanovi , Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human
Rights?, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 69 (2010).
218. The power of jus cogens obligations to bind the Security Council has
been recognized in numerous instances. See, e.g., Case No. T-315/01, Kadi v.
Council, 2005 E.C.R. II 3724; Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court]
Nov. 14, 2007, 133 Entscheidungen Des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts
[BGE] II 450 (Switz.). For academic contemplation, see Kamrul Hossain, The
Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under the U.N. Charter, 3 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 72 (2005); Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 59 (2005); Alexander Orakhelashvili,
PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 423 38 (2006); Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Collective Security and Human Rights, in NORMATIVE HIERARCHY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 42, 54 (Erika de Wet & Jure Vidmar eds., 2012); Tomuschat, supra note 132.
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To speak of limitations on this level, of course, is to engage in
a sort of formalist legal argument an attempt to understand
how to conceptualize Security Council powers as a matter of law,
rather than as a matter of practice. In order to obtain a fuller
understanding of the relationship between the Security Council
and international legal obligations, it is necessary to go beyond
the formal level, and to attempt to understand the way in which
Security Council decisions have in fact interacted with evolving
legal standards over time.
It is helpful in the first place, in such a context, to reverse the
direction of inquiry, and instead of asking whether the Security
Council is bounded by law, to consider whether or not it functions as a law-maker. The question of the Security Council’s lawmaking power in fact arose during the ILC’s work on the Draft
Articles, in the course of the ILC’s contemplation of appropriate
responses to the most serious violations of international law. As
James Crawford observed in that context:
Another problem with State crimes was its relation to the provisions of the Charter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Under the Charter the Security
Council has a primary role with respect to the maintenance of
international peace and security. In that context it has dealt
with many of the most serious examples of what draft Article
19 defined as State crimes: for example, Iraq’s aggression
In addition to these more readily apparent and accepted sources of limitations, other arguments for limitation can be made. First, Security Council
member states may be understood as remaining bound by their various obligations even when sitting on the Security Council a position in fact suggested
by the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations. See
ILC, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, in
Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., Supp. No.
10, at 67, U.N. Doc. A/66/10 (2011). Second, certain principles, such as general
principles of due process, might be understood as “applicable to international
organizations as subjects of international law when they exercise governmental’ authority over individuals.” Fassbender, supra note 37, at 5.
For further contemplations of limitations on Security Council action, see
DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER
CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER
LEGAL LIMITS AND THE ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (Peter Malanczuk ed., 2001); Nicolas Angelet, International Law Limits to the Security Council, in UNITED NATIONS
SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001). ERIKA
DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
(2004); ANTONIOS TZANAKOPOULOS, DISOBEYING THE SECURITY COUNCIL:
COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST WRONGFUL SANCTIONS (2011).
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against Kuwait; the maintenance of colonial domination in Namibia and Rhodesia; ethnic conflict and war crimes in former
Yugoslavia, apartheid in South Africa. Its role has been central
in coordinating the international response to such egregious
breaches.219

While the reference to state crimes was removed from the final
Draft Articles, the ILC cited to similar examples of Security
Council practice in the context of Articles 40 and 41, pertaining
to breaches of peremptory norms.220 By relying upon Security
Council practice in crafting its statement of the rules of international responsibility in the context of the most serious violations
of international law, the ILC suggested that such practice plays
an important role in shaping international law. As GowllandDebbas has put it elsewhere:
a legal construction can be made of the Council’s discretionary
determinations . . . Although the Council is not required to react to violations of international law, its practice in the form
of contingency decisions which are the outcomes of political activity produces recognizable legal patterns which change the
legal positions not only of States, but also of individuals, engendering legal consequences and making possible new normative expectations.221

In short, it appears that Security Council decisions, whatever
their origins, help to shape international law going forward.
Not all Security Council decisions, however, will make an
equal contribution to shaping the law. Instead, the extent to
which a particular Security Council determination contributes
to the formation of international law depends upon the extent to
which that decision fits into the preexisting international legal
framework. In reality, this process depends not only on the nature of the decision itself, but also on the manner in which it is

219. Crawford, supra note 119, at 458.
220. See S.C. Res. 217, supra note 191; S.C. Res. 218, supra note 192; S.C.
Res. 232, supra note 11; S.C. Res. 277, supra note 191; S.C. Res. 418, supra
note 11; S.C. Res. 569, supra note 191; Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 2, at 115, art. 41, cmt. 12.
221. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 215, at 287 88. See also VERA GOWLLANDDEBBAS, COLLECTIVE RESPONSE TO ILLEGAL ACTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990);
Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of
State Responsibility, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 55 (1994).
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dealt with afterwards by the broader international legal community.222 Should that community favor a rule advanced by a particular Security Council decision, it may pick it up, highlight it,
advocate on its behalf and disseminate it. Should a decision be
deemed problematic, it may be criticized or simply ignored, diminishing the impact of that decision on the future formation of
the law.223
222. Often known as the “invisible college of international lawyers.” The reference comes from Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 217 (1977). For some more recent reflections on the
functioning of the invisible college, see Santiago Villalpando, The Invisible
College of International Lawyers Forty Years Later, (ESIL 2013 5th Research
Forum: International law as a Profession Conference Paper No. 5/2013).
223. Examples of the invisible college’ at work in such a direction are numerous. Lori Fisler Damrosch is one jurist who has worked in such a manner. As
she has put it, testifying to her belief in the project of an international sanctions policy bounded by law:
Selectivity in the adoption of sanctions may be inevitable for
the foreseeable future, as key international actors set the
agenda in accordance with their own perceptions of interests
and resource constraints . . . but over the longer term, as the
international community matures, elaboration of normative
criteria for the application of sanctions will be a critical step,
leading to the eventual goal of treating like cases alike.
Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions, in
ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 274,
277 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993). For other articles which help to advance
a similar project, see, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Collective Enforcement of
International Norms Through Economic Sanctions, 8 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 59
(1994); W. Michael Reisman & Douglas Stevick, The Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes, 9
EUR. J. INT’L L. 86 (1998); M. Shervin Majlessi, Use of Economic Sanctions under International Law: A Contemporary Assessment, 39 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 253
(2001); Eugenia Lopez-Jacoiste, The UN Collective Security System and its Relationship with Economic Sanctions and Human Rights, 14 MAX PLANCK Y.B.
U.N. L. 273 (2010).
The invisible college’ has diversified and expanded over recent decades (on
which point see Jose Alvarez, The Democratization of the Invisible College,
ASIL PRESIDENTIAL COLUMN (2007)). If anything, this has likely increased the
strength of normative voices in international affairs, as the comparative predominance of those linked, formally or informally, to the foreign affairs officers
of major state powers has diminished. For a similar recognition that at least a
relative opening up of access to international law has occurred, and that it has
been positive, see BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM
BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 96
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Having recognized that Security Council resolutions can shape
the law, but also that the extent to which they do so is not absolute, but rather dependent upon the manner in which they are
received and interpreted, it is possible to turn to another part of
the relevant equation how the Security Council makes its decisions in practice. In this context, a brief digression into theory
concerning the development of legal precedent will be helpful.
As Martin Shapiro and Alex Stone Sweet, perhaps the best
known theorists of the evolution of judicial processes, have observed, adjudicatory bodies, when called upon to resolve disputes, face a double bind.224 On the one hand, they must produce
some sort of resolution; on the other hand, they must attempt to
maintain a good reputation, in order to preserve their authority.225 Therefore, such bodies seek to deploy a variety of strategies in order to maintain and promote their legitimacy, including
employing reasoned systems of judgment, and attempting to develop consistent frameworks through which to make their decisions.226 Over time, adjudicative bodies tend to develop a system
of precedential law, in order to enhance their legitimacy and authority.227
Shapiro and Stone Sweet’s theory was developed relative to
nascent judicial decisions-makers. In many ways, however, and
perhaps surprisingly, given that the Security Council is not a
judicial body, the underlying structural situation faced by the
Security Council is similar. As the 1992 United Nations Agenda
for Peace observed, “the principles of the Charter must be applied consistently, not selectively, for if the perception should be
of the latter, trust will wane and with it the moral authority

(2003); Christine Chinkin, Jus Cogens, Article 103 of the UN Charter and Other
Hierarchical Techniques of Conflict Solution, 17 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 63, 64
(2006). For arguments in favor of a pluralistic, contested international space,
see Bruno Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 845
(2004); William Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 963 (2004); Nico Krisch, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST
STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW (2010).
224. See Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, in ON LAW, POLITICS, & JUDICIALIZATION 62 (2002). See also Martin
Shapiro, Towards a Theory of Stare Decisis, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 125 (1972);
MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981).
225. See Sweet, supra note 224.
226. Id. at 62 65.
227. Id.
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which is the greatest and most unique quality of that instrument.”228 Given the Security Council’s desire to make its sanctions regimes effective and the fact that, since it lacks its own
enforcement arm, it must rely upon state compliance in order to
achieve such effectiveness it has a strong incentive to shape its
actions in such a way as to promote its legitimacy and authority.229 As with the arbitral bodies considered by Shapiro and
Stone Sweet, the best way for it to do that is by acting consistently, not selectively’ in short, in compliance with background
international legal rules.
The Security Council, therefore, has a strong rationale to reach
decisions and issue resolutions justified in terms of, and broadly
in compliance with, the pre-existing international legal frame.
This process is, moreover, self-reinforcing. Security Council resolutions which are carefully and consistently presented, in compliance with existing legal standards, will serve to further
strengthen the norms upon which they rely, prompting the Security Council, in turn, to continue down similar lines in future.230

228. U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, ¶ 82, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (June 17, 1992).
229. Perhaps the most influential study on the effectiveness of sanctions
identifies three different ways in which sanctions may influence actors: (1)
through coercion; (2) through constraining freedom of action; and (3) through
signaling. See THOMAS BIERSTEKER, SUE ECKERT & MARCOS TOURINHO,
DESIGNING UNITED NATIONS TARGETED SANCTIONS: INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE
TARGETED SANCTIONS CONSORTIUM (2012). Amongst these three modalities, signaling is found to be the most effective approach. If signaling is to be maximally
effective, however, it is important that the signals put out be somewhat consistent. Relative to the question of signaling effectiveness too, therefore, there
are grounds for preferring a more legal’ framework to a more discretionary
one.
230. A simple sociological explanation has resonance here, too. Security
Council resolutions are typically prepared by trained international lawyers.
Such individuals are likely to work to shape the resolutions in accordance, to
the extent possible, with their understandings of international legality. In doing so, they will likely often rely upon the text of past sanctions as examples.
Past sanctions resolutions which are clearer, more specific, and rely upon universal rather than particular logics and categorizations, are most likely to provide helpful models. The most legalistic and law-compliant models are likely,
therefore, to be picked up, serving to further entrench the standards advanced
by those models. Such a process can be seen, amongst other places, in the gradual incorporation of rights language into sanctions, considered in Section III
above. See supra Part III.
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In exploring the question of the tension between discretion and
constraint in international affairs, this section has focused on
the Security Council, for the simple reason that it is the entity
with the greatest degree of discretionary power in the current
international order. If the discretion of the Security Council is at
least somewhat bounded by law, then so must be that of all other
international actors. As this section has highlighted, there are a
variety of formal reasons to understand the Security Council as
so bound. Over and beyond those formal reasons, there are also
more practical reasons, which constantly push the Security
Council in the direction of more extensive compliance with law
in practice. These more abstract contemplations are illustrated,
of course, by the manner in which international sanctions regimes have been increasingly influenced by public international
law and rights-based concerns over time, both in the context of
the Security Council and beyond.
CONCLUSION
This article has highlighted various ways in which public international law and rights-based concerns have come to shape
the scope, targeting, functioning and framing of international
sanctions regimes over the past several decades. It began by exploring a pair of well-recognized developments the move from
general to targeted sanctions and the incorporation of due process protections into targeted sanctions procedures. Between
them, these developments have limited the manner in which
sanctions may be deployed, by considering the effects overly
broad and loosely targeted sanctions have on the rights of those
targeted. The article then turned to explore a third, less-recognized development the gradual evolution of a potential obligation to sanction, relative to the most serious violations of international law. This development was explored at length due to
the fact that it has not been widely-recognized before, such that
it was necessary to pull all the relevant evidence together in order to demonstrate the extent to which such an evolution has in
fact occurred. Finally, the article took a step back, in order to
consider the relationship between discretion and law in international affairs from a broader angle. In doing so, the article highlighted the various factors that push the Security Council towards compliance with law, providing a more general framework
through which to assess the evolutions that have occurred in the
context of sanctions in particular.
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In the broadest terms, this article has been concerned with the
increasing strength of public law norms within the international
legal order. This is not the first piece of scholarship to recognize
the growing strength of such norms. There are, in fact, at least
three different frames through which international lawyers
have attempted to describe that development in the past. The
first has been advanced most prominently by the German jurist,
Bruno Simma, in his description of the movement “from bilateralism to community interest.”231 The second describes the development in question as an advancement of the international rule
of law.232 The third sees an emphasis on humanity as responsible
for the growing strength of public international law.233 All three
characterizations capture elements contested, to be sure of
international law in the modern era.234 The evolutions in sanctions practice considered in this article lend support, moreover,
to all three of the above framings. At times, the developments in
question have had a great deal to do with the idea of communal
interests.235 At other times they have pertained to the idea of the

231. See Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International
Law, supra note 136.
232. This approach has been forcefully advanced by Aust, among others; see
AUST, supra note 100, ch. 3.
233. This approach has been advanced in different ways by figures such as
Lauterpacht, Meron, Trindade and Teitel. See THEODOR MERON, THE
HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); ANTONIO CANCADO TRINDADE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR HUMANKIND: TOWARDS A NEW JUS GENTIUM (2010);
RUIT TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW (2011); ANTONIO CANCADO TRINDADE, JUDGE
ANTONIO A. CANCADO TRINDADE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A HUMANIZED
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015).
234. For some other works highlighting the extent to which contemporary
international law can best be understood as shaped by the tension between
these new ideas and more traditional approaches to international law, see
Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind
on the Eve of a New Century: General Course on Public International Law, 281
RECUEIL DES COURS 11 (1999); Santiago Villalpando, The Legal Dimension of
the International Community: How Community Interests Are Protected in International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387 (2010).
235. The evolution of jus cogens norms, especially when advanced under the
label of erga omnes norms, was particularly closely linked to the idea of community interest.
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rule of law.236 At other moments, they have been primarily motivated by humanist concerns.237 In the end, therefore, all three
framings are perhaps best thought of as three different ways of
characterizing the same underlying development.
One might have expected that evolutions in international law
and international affairs would follow a simple sequential pattern: first the law would evolve, and then, in order to comply
with the law, states would amend their practice. The reality in
the context of the evolution of international sanctions, however,
has been more complex. Contrary to what one might have expected, ideas of legal obligation have rarely influenced state action directly. Rather, the gradual development of a sense of legal
obligation to impose sanctions relative to the worst instances of
violation has occurred, for the most part, in parallel to the manner in which sanctions have increasingly come to be targeted
against the worst rights violators, and without express reference
to a sense of legal obligation. Changes in both law and practice,
that is, seem to occur side-by-side.
The puzzle relative to such a development starts to fade when
one shifts to think about the relevant actors. Most fundamentally, changes in both law and practice are produced by the hard
work of communities of concerned actors. These communities include humanist advocates, who have pushed back against and
criticized overly broad sanctions; lawyers who have fought for
the due process rights of their clients, and judges who have
heeded those calls; practitioners and bureaucrats, who have
shaped the language and conceptual framing of those sanctions
that have been implemented; and scholars and international jurists, who have worked to clarify and develop the law, and to
highlight its implications in the sanctions context. These communities do not only focus their efforts on the law, or on practice rather, they focus on both simultaneously. Recognizing the
primary significance of such actors, therefore, helps to explain
why developments in the law and practice of sanctions have
tended to parallel one another, rather than one exerting a clear
precedence over and influence on the other.
The overarching aim of this article has been to demonstrate
that, contrary to the expectations of realist theorists, rights236. The emphasis on the importance of due process guarantees is clearly
closely linked to the idea of the rule of law.
237. The limitation of overly broad sanctions, due to the harms they inflicted,
was most clearly motivated by humanist concerns.
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based concerns have exerted substantial influence in the realm
of high-stakes international affairs. The typical juxtaposition between realists and idealists tends to obscure the extent to which
norms operate as a significant force in the world, with distinct
practical consequences. A clear-eyed examination of the last several decades, however, reveals that rights-based concerns have
substantially influenced and shaped sanctions practice over the
past several decades. The result has been a movement from a
field generally defined by political discretion, to one that has
been brought increasingly within the frame of law. Such a trend
is only likely to continue in years to come.

